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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
REHAN HASSAN, : Case No. 20020885-SC 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from two convictions for aggravated burglary, first degree felonies, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-203 (1999), and three convictions for assault, class 
B misdemeanors, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (1999). This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-2(3)(i) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Though defendant conceded below that he voluntarily and knowingly waived his 
right to a jury trial, has he nevertheless established that the trial court plainly erred in 
accepting the waiver without explaining the jury selection process? 
Defendant did not advance this theory below and, therefore, consideration of its merits 
for the first time on appeal is precluded unless defendant demonstrates plain error, that is, 
that the trial court obviously erred in accepting defendant's otherwise undisputed voluntary 
and knowing jury waiver without informing him of the jury selection process, and that, 
absent the error, there exists a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been more favorable to defendant. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT 33, U 41, 488 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 14 (reaffirming that obvious prejudicial error may be considered for the first time on 
appeal). See also Davis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 891 -92 (Utah App. 
1995) (applying the "more rigorous" plain error standard to review "a completely differen 
theory" than argued in a motion for new trial). 
2. Has defendant established that the court plainly erred in allowing him to represent 
himself during the motion for new trial evidentiary hearing after defendant asked to proceed 
pro se and refused the assistance of competent and conflicts-free appointed counsel? 
Where a defendant expressly declines an offer of counsel, "he has the burden of 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not so waive his right to counsel." 
State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f 74, 63 P.3d 731. Accord State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, \ 
22, 979 P.2d 799. Because defendant did not object when the court permitted him to 
proceed pro se, he must now establish that the court plainly erred in concluding that his 
waiver of counsel was voluntary and knowing. See Casey, 2003 UT 33, f 41. 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rule is reproduced in its entirety in Addendum A, together with any 
other provision cited in argument: 
2 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(c) - All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the 
defendant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the court and the 
consent of the prosecution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 8, 1999, defendant was charged in Third District Court Case No. 991911407 
[#1407] with two aggravated burglaries arising from illegal entries into Carol and J.D. 
Miller's apartment on May 29, 1999 (R1407: 2-4). In the same information, defendant was 
charged with three misdemeanor assaults for his subsequent assaults on Carol and J.D. and 
a June 3, 1999, assault on Kathy Harris at the same apartment complex (id.). A month later, 
defendant was charged in Third District Court Case No. 991915044 [#5044] with aggravated 
burglary based on a third illegal entry into the Millers' apartment on May 29 (R5044: 1-3). 
Following separate preliminary hearings, the cases were consolidated for trial (R1407:12-13; 
R5044: 62-63).1 
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial (R1407: 92-93; R5044: 106; R456: 3-8).2 
See Addendum B (Jury Waiver Colloquy). On May 15-16, 2000, Judge Anne Stirba 
1
 The State cites to the pleadings in case #1407 as R1407: page # and in case 
#5504 as R5044: page #. Citation to the consolidated hearing/trial transcripts are by 
external record number followed by internal page, i.e., R454: 1. 
2
 During the hearing on the motion for new trial, defendant conceded and the court 
concluded that defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived jury trial (R454: 29 & 144). 
See Addendum E (Findings, Conclusions, and Denial of Motion for New Trial). 
Defendant does not challenge this ruling on appeal, but argues that Utah law requires an 
explanation of the jury selection process before a waiver may be accepted {Brief of 
Appellant [Br.Aplt] at 1-2 & Point /). Defendant is entitled to raise a claim for the first 
time on appeal under the plain error doctrine, but is bound by the lower court's 
unchallenged findings and conclusions. See Davis, 905 P.2d at 890. 
3 
conducted a bench trial, during which defendant was represented by appointed counsel, 
Edward Montgomery (R1407: 94-100; R5044: 120-22). Judge Stirba concluded that the 
evidence failed to establish that defendant possessed a gun during one of the illegal entries 
and acquitted defendant of Count I in #1407 (R1407: 99-100, 182). See Addendum C 
(Findings, Conclusions, and Order of Conviction). The judge found defendant guilty of the 
remaining five charges (R1407:99-105,282-87; R5044:123,127-32). See Add C. On July 
18, 2000, defendant was sentenced to two terms of five-years-to-life imprisonment on the 
felonies and three terms of six months incarceration on the misdemeanors, all sentences to 
run concurrently (R1407: 204-05; R5044: 148-49). 
Defendant privately retained Mary Corporon, who filed a motion for new trial which 
alleged that trial counsel (Montgomery) was ineffective in failing to call a locksmith as an 
expert witness and that an "alibi" witness, defendant's former girlfriend Maleena Tu Phan, 
was located four days after trial (R1407: 202, 211-16; R5044: 143-47).3 Before the motion 
was heard, defendant elected to proceed pro se (R1407: 296, 304-05, 370-72, 399, 409-10; 
R204: 9-10; R449: 5-6, 11, 16-21; R452: 12-13; R453: 3-8; R455: 2-15; R457: 6-9). 
3
 Defendant referred to Maleena as an "alibi" witness, but the court, in denying the 
motion for new trial, found that because defendant admitted he was at the Millers' 
apartment, Maleena did not provide an "alibi" (R1407: 423-24; R5044: 198-99; R454: 
115-18). See Add. E. Moreover, her proffered testimony did not exculpate defendant 
because she heard defendant arguing with a woman, but did not otherwise know what 
occurred (id.). Defendant does not challenge the court's findings and conclusions on 
appeal. 
4 
Prior to proceeding pro se, defendant retained, was appointed, or was offered the 
services of nine attorneys. David Grindstaff was initially appointed and represented 
defendant through preliminary hearing (R1407: 10-13). Mr. Grindstaff withdrew when 
defendant privately retained Ron Yengich, who represented defendant through pretrial 
conference (R1407: 25-40; R5044: 19-42). Mr. Yengich negotiated an "extremely good" 
plea offer, but defendant accused him of being an "undercover jew" and of conspiring against 
him because he was Muslim (R1407: 41, 310, 345-46). Mr. Yengich withdrew based on 
"irreconcilable differences" (R1407: 42,45; R5044: 46-48).4 Paul Quinlan of the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association (LDA) was appointed, but withdrew because LDA represented 
Carol Miller, a victim in this case, in a pre-existing misdemeanor assault on her husband 
(R1407: 71-73, 77-86). Conflicts-counsel Edward Montgomery was then appointed and 
represented defendant through trial (R1407: 86-100; R5044: 64-122). Prior to sentencing, 
Mr. Montgomery withdraw when his relationship with defendant "completely deteriorated" 
(R1407: 176-77, 297-98; R5044: 142; R448: 3-4).5 Defendant privately retained Mary 
Corporon, who represented defendant at sentencing and filed the motion for new trial (id.). 
4
 Defendant persistently denounced Mr. Yengich as an "evil person . . . an enemy 
of Islam," who "totally betrayed" him and "totally messed up" his case; however, 
defendant did not claim in his motion for new trial and does not claim on appeal that Mr. 
Yengich was ineffective (R1407: 345-46; R449: 5, 12-13). 
5
 In his motion for new trial, defendant alleged that Montgomery was ineffective 
(R1407: 211-16; R453: 11-13). The court concluded that he was not (R1407: 420-24; 
R5044: 195-99). See Add E. Defendant has not challenged the court's findings or 
conclusions on appeal. 
5 
Eventually, Ms. Corporon moved to withdraw based on ethical considerations and 
defendant's refusal to cooperate with her (R1407: 260-61; R448: 10-12; Exhibit 3).6 Heidi 
Buchi (LDA) was appointed, but withdrew due to a conflict, and conflicts-counsel Stephen 
McCaughey was appointed (R1407: 287-94). Mr. McCaughey reviewed the pleadings, the 
findings in support of the verdict, and the new trial motion and memoranda; he did not 
review the trial transcripts because they were not yet prepared (R449: 3). After Mr. 
McCaughey arranged for the trial transcription, he withdraw due to "irreconcilable 
differences" with defendant (R1407: 296-300).7 
Defendant never objected to the withdrawal of his attorneys. According to defendant, 
the attorneys were attempting to "override" his decisions (R204: 9-10, R449: 4-6). He 
6
 Defendant believed Ms. Corporon tried to unduly "silence" him when she 
criticized his wife's contacts with Judge Stirba and the judge's husband and when she 
warned defendant that his denunciations of Mormons and other "enemies of Islam" would 
backfire (R1407: 345-46; R449: 5; Exhibit 3). While defendant was upset with Ms. 
Corporon, he did not allege her ineffectiveness below or on appeal. 
7
 Defendant speculates that Mr. McCaughey was unprepared to proceed on the 
motion for new trial {Br.Aplt. at 28 & n.6). While it is true that the trial transcripts were 
not yet prepared, this does not support defendant's claim that Mr. McCaughey was 
unfamiliar with the relatively simple facts of the case. In moving to withdraw, Mr. 
McCaughey explained that he had reviewed various documents relevant to the new trial 
motion and concluded that the motion was not likely to succeed; when he expressed this 
view to defendant, defendant asked him to withdraw (R449: 3, 9). Defendant asserted 
that he asked Mr. McCaughey to withdrew because he was "unduly influenced" by 
defendant's "enemy," Mr. Yengich (R449: 5). See supra, n.4. Defendant did not allege 
in his motion for new trial that Mr. McCaughey was ineffective and has not raised an 
ineffectiveness claim on appeal. 
6 
acknowledged that he could get along with them if they did what he wanted, but admitted 
that he was difficult (R204: 9-10; R455: 8). 
After Mr. McCaughey withdrew, defendant asked to represent himself (R1407: 296, 
304-05, 370-72, 399, 409-10; R204: 9-10; R449: 5-6, 11, 16-21; R452: 12-13; R453: 3-8; 
R455: 2-15; R457: 6-9). Defendant wanted assistance in subpoenaing his prior counsel as 
witnesses for the hearing on the new trial motion, but otherwise believed he was capable of 
representing himself (R1407: 304-05; R449: 4-11). After conducting a Frampton-type 
colloquy8, the court permitted defendant to proceed pro se, but appointed LDA as standby 
counsel (R449: 16-20). See Addendum D (Self-Representation Colloquies). 
LDA subsequently withdrew and Richard Mauro, conflicts-counsel, was appointed 
(R1407: 353). Mr. Mauro hired an investigator to locate Maleena and other witnesses 
necessary for the new trial hearing (R1407; 396-98). Mr. Mauro borrowed defendant's copy 
of the trial transcripts, which had been delivered to defendant at the prison based on his pro 
se status (R1407:343,396-98). Mr. Mauro was in the process of subpoenaing witnesses and 
preparing for hearing when defendant filed a complaint with the Utah State Bar accusing him 
of stealing the transcripts (R1407: 396-98). Consequently, Mr. Mauro withdrew from the 
case (id.).9 Defendant told the court that Mr. Mauro's withdrawal made little difference to 
8
 State v. Frampton, 111 P.2d 183, 188-89 (Utah 1987) (recommending that a trial 
court conduct a sixteen-point colloquy before permitting a defendant to represent himself 
in a criminal trial). 
9
 Mr. Mauro filed an affidavit which explained his preparation and the 
circumstances surrounding his use of defendant's transcripts (R1407: 396-98). Other 
7 
his preparation because Mr. Mauro was only stand-by counsel; defendant was ready to 
proceed pro se and only needed assistance in subpoenaing his witnesses (R1407: 399). 
Three days after Mr. Mauro withdraw, the court offered to appoint another conflicts 
attorney, Manny Garcia (R455: 2-10). Hearing on the motion for new trial had previously 
been set for the same day, but the court was willing to continue the hearing to allow Mr. 
Garcia time to prepare (id.).10 Defendant objected and insisted that he could proceed without 
Mr. Garcia's assistance as long as subpoenas were issued for his witnesses (id.). The court 
agreed to help defendant secure his witnesses, and then questioned him on whether he still 
wished to proceed pro se (R455: 6-27). See Add. D. Defendant did (id.).11 
At his own request, defendant proceeded to lay "foundation" for his motion exhibits 
and outline his new trial arguments in anticipation of the evidentiary hearing, which was 
continued until defendant's witnesses could be subpoenaed (R455: 44-54).12 In setting out 
than the bar complaint, defendant has not claimed below or on appeal that Mr. Mauro was 
ineffective. 
10
 Defendant's assertion that the court forced him to proceed that day (Br.Aplt. at 
35 n.9), has no record support. See Add. D (R455: 2-15). 
11
 On appeal, defendant insinuates that Mr. Garcia was neglectfully unprepared and 
this caused defendant to proceed pro se (Br.Aplt. at 34-35). Below, defendant never 
claimed this. In fact, he was apologetic to Mr. Garcia for refusing his assistance and 
assured him that his refusal had nothing to do with Mr. Garcia personally (R455: 6-11). 
He just felt that any new attorney would need three months to prepare and defendant 
believed he was ready to proceed once his witnesses were subpoenaed (id.). 
12
 Defendant asked to proceed in this fashion because he wanted the court to 
review his exhibits before the hearing (R455: 49). 
8 
his argument, defendant quoted rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, governing 
motions for new trial, and acknowledged its limitations (R455: 17-71). See Addendum A 
(Cited Provisions). The court noted that defendant evidenced an understanding of court 
procedures (R455: 15).13 
During the subsequent evidentiary hearing, defendant continued to represent himself 
(R454: 4). He called as witnesses his former trial counsel, Mr. Montgomery; Nathan Pace, 
Mr. Montgomery's conflicts-contract associate; Detective Burningham, the investigating 
officer; and Mr. Paul Parker, the trial prosecutor (R454: 7-132). He also proffered the 
testimony of Maleena, his missing witness, and submitted his exhibits (id.). Defendant 
extensively argued the motion for new trial, gaining the praise of the court for his reasonable 
presentation (R454: 136-48, 164-68). Nevertheless, the court denied it. Specifically, the 
court found and concluded that (1) defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to 
a jury trial and his counsel, Mr. Montgomery, legitimately concurred in defendant's decision; 
(2) Mr. Montgomery conducted adequate pretrial investigation and legitimately chose not to 
present an expert locksmith or character witnesses; (3) Mr. Montgomery conducted an active 
and viable defense and, despite its lack of success, provided defendant with effective 
13
 At various times, defendant expressed his understanding that: a discretionary 
standard applied in reviewing a motion for new trial; the pending new trial motion needed 
to be resolved before he could appeal; trial error must substantially impact a verdict to 
justify a new trial; if Judge Stirba had lived, she would have been in a better position than 
the judge assigned to the motion to access the impact of any "newly discovered" evidence 
since she observed the trial witnesses; and if the victims were believed, the evidence was 
sufficient to support the convictions (R1407: 119; R455: 22-24). 
9 
representation at trial; (4) even if Maleena had been located prior to trial, her testimony did 
not provide an "alibi" for defendant and was cumulative of other evidence presented at trial; 
and, therefore, (5) there was no basis upon which to grant defendant a new trial (R1407:419-
26; R5044: 194-201). See Add. E. 
At defendant's request, LDA was appointed to represent defendant on appeal (R454: 
168). A timely notice of appeal was filed (R1407: 458-74). 
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdicts or the denial of his motion for new trial. Instead, defendant advances arguments 
which were neither raised nor preserved below. Defendant acknowledges that for this Court 
to consider the arguments, he must establish plain error (Br.Aplt. at 1-2). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS14 
Defendant admitted that around May 29, 1999, the electricity to his apartment was 
cut off by the power company for non-payment (R450: 158-60). Without authorization, he 
ran an extension cord from his apartment to a common basement laundry room where he 
plugged the cord into power outlets belonging to the apartment complex (R450:161). Carol 
and J.D. Miller lived across the hall from defendant (R450:21-22). The Millers were not the 
apartment managers, but received a discount on their rent to watch the building. When J.D. 
14
 Though he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 
convictions, defendant argues that the Millers' testimony was inconsistent and, therefore, 
any error is necessarily prejudicial (Br.Aplt. at 23). The State summarizes the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the verdicts. See State v. Nichols, 2003 UT App 287, % 1, n. 1, 
76P.3d 1173. 
10 
Miller saw the extension cord in the laundry room, he unplugged it, but did not confront 
defendant (R450: 92-93). See Add C, Findings 1-7. 
Later that day, defendant and his then-girlfriend, Maleena, went to his apartment and 
discovered no power (R450: 163-66). Defendant assumed the Millers had interfered with 
the extension cord (R450: 166-67). He was upset because he felt that neighbors should take 
care of neighbors (id.). See Add, C, Findings 8-9. 
Defendant admitted that he went to the Millers' apartment, Carol answered the door, 
and a verbal argument ensued (R450: 167-70, 183). After Carol closed the door, defendant 
admitted he kicked the door several times in frustration (id.). See Add, C, Findings 8-12. 
What occurred next was disputed. According to defendant, he simply went back to 
his apartment and had no more interaction with the Millers (R450: 170). Five days later, he 
testified that Kathy Harris, the wife of the apartment manager, and Carol went to defendant's 
apartment to discuss his unauthorized use of the building's electricity (R450: 173-74). An 
extension cord was running from defendant's front door into a hallway electrical outlet 
(R450:113-14,174). Kathy told defendant that he could not use the building's power (R450: 
175). According to defendant, Kathy then reached inside his door to unplug the cord (id.). 
He pushed her back (R450: 176). Kathy called the police and he was arrested (R450: 177). 
The Millers and Kathy Harris described a different scenario. The Millers testified that 
on May 29, defendant kicked in their front door and illegally entered their apartment three 
times, assaulted Carol twice and J.D. once, and threatened to kill them if they called the 
11 
police (R450: 10-40,96-99).l5 They did not immediately report the burglaries or assaults to 
the police because the Millers and defendant were the only tenants in the building and the 
Millers had no telephone (R450: 87,100,125). Moreover, defendant was 29 years old, 6' 2", 
and weighed 160 pounds (R450: 178). Carol Miller was almost sixty and weighed only 88 
pounds (R450:27). Additionally, the Millers felt their injuries were minor and J.D. was able 
to fix the damaged door (R450: 81, 104). See Add C, Findings 12-26. 
On June 3, Carol reported defendant's unauthorized use of the building's electricity 
to Kathy Harris (R450:113). Kathy and Carol went to defendant's apartment and confronted 
him (id.). Kathy testified that she did not reach into defendant's apartment—she only 
attempted to unplug the extension cord from the outlet in the building's hallway (R450:113-
17). When she bent down, defendant hit her in the mouth, pushed her up against the Millers' 
door, grabbed her hair, and kicked her "a lot" of times (R450: 117). See Add. C, Findings 
2 7-38. Unlike the Millers, Kathy immediately reported the incident to the police (R450:123-
24). When the police arrived, the Millers told them of the assaults and burglaries five days 
earlier (R450: 123-25). 
15
 Carol also testified that defendant displayed a gun, but J.D. never saw a weapon 
(R450: 39, 99). A realistic gun-shaped cigarette lighter was found in defendant's vehicle 
(R450: 138-39). The trial court concluded that the evidence did not establish that 
defendant possessed a gun during any of the illegal entries and acquitted defendant of 
Count I, Case #1407 (R1407: 184, 187; R5044: 129, 132). 
12 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Waiver of Jury Trial: During the hearing on the motion for new trial, defendant 
conceded and the court concluded that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right 
to a jury trial. Nevertheless, defendant now claims that the trial court plainly erred in 
accepting the waiver because it did not follow the procedure of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which requires an explanation of the jury selection process 
before a waiver is accepted. At the same time, defendant acknowledges that Utah has not yet 
adopted the Seventh Circuit requirement. His acknowledgment necessarily defeats his claim 
of obvious error. Moreover, even in jurisdictions which follow the Seventh Circuit rule, 
failure to follow the rule does not result in automatic reversal. Instead, the appellate court 
looks to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the jury waiver to determine if it was 
otherwise knowing and voluntary. Here, defendant conceded below that it was. 
Waiver of Counsel re Motion for New Trial: Defendant was offered multiple 
competent and conflict-free counsel to assist him with his motion for new trial, but ultimately 
chose to proceed/?ro se. Two judges questioned him on two different occasions concerning 
his choice. Both concluded that defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was voluntary and 
knowing. Defendant has not established that any alleged deficiencies in those colloquies 
plainly negated the validity of his waiver. 
13 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
ACCEPTING DEFENDANTS WAIVER OF A JURY TRIAL WITHOUT 
INFORMING HIM OF THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS 
During the evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion for new trial, the prosecutor and 
later the court questioned defendant's former trial counsel (Montgomery) about the 
circumstances surrounding defendant's waiver of a jury trial (R454: 50 & 56-57). Counsel 
testified that defendant first suggested a bench trial because he was concerned that a Utah 
jury would be less inclined to believe a Muslim Pakistani national, like himself, and more 
likely to credit white Americans, like the Millers and Harris (id.). While defendant believed 
this was arose from inherent racism, he also recognized that people will often more readily 
believe individuals similar to themselves (R1407: 53, 56A, 325). Two of defendant's 
attorneys (Grindstaff and Montgomery) believed Judge Stirba, the trial judge, was strict, but 
a non-racist, who hated liars—a bias beneficial to defendant's theory that the victims were 
lying (R1407: 311). Defendant had observed the judge and felt she was fair (R1407: 119, 
345). Consequently, defendant stated that he 
planned, based on the way I planned the case, the way I evaluated the case, I 
planned to go ahead for the [bench] trial based on what I though information 
would be brought up, and I evaluated it, based on that information, there would 
be a reasonable doubt, very clearly, a reasonable doubt in the mind of Judge 
Stirba that this thing did not happen. 
(R454: 29). Defendant conceded that 
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I picked the judge and the jury, of course, it was my decision to pick the judge, 
because I felt she would treat me-she would be more fair to me. 
(R454: 144). In denying the motion for new trial, the court found that defendant's decision 
to waive the jury was done with the legitimate concurrence of his trial counsel and concluded 
that the waiver was voluntary and knowing (R1407: 420-21 & 423; R5044: 195-96 & 198). 
See Addendum E (Findings and Conclusions - Denial of Motion for New Trial). 
Defendant does not challenge this ruling on appeal. Instead, for the first time, he 
claims that the trial court plainly erred in accepting the jury waiver because it did not follow 
the procedure of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and explain the 
jury selection process to defendant (Br.Aplt. at 1-2 & 15). The argument is without merit. 
(A) The Trial Court Fully Complied with Utah Procedure in Accepting 
Defendant's Waiver. 
Rule 17(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, directs that all felony cases will be 
tried by jury "unless the defendant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the court 
and the consent of the prosecution" (emphasis added). See Addendum A (Cited Provisions). 
Here, it is undisputed that the trial court fully complied with the rule (R456: 5-8). See 
Addendum B (Jury Waiver Colloquy). Utah has no other mandated procedure governing jury 
waiver. Consequently, Utah procedural rules provide no predicate for defendant's claim of 
obvious error. 
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(B) The Trial Court Properly Concluded that Defendant Knowingly and 
Voluntarily Waived His Right to a Jury Trial. 
Because the right to a jury trial is constitutional, its waiver must be knowing and 
voluntary. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930); State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 
474,476-77 (Utah 1990). Utah requires the waiver to be in open court, but does not mandate 
a set colloquy. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(c). Instead, the validity of a jury waiver is judged 
by the totality of its surrounding circumstances. Moosman, 794 P.2d at 478-79. 
Here, the trial court conducted a colloquy with defendant to determine if his decision 
to waive a jury: was knowing and voluntary. See Add. B. Defendant had previously 
discussed the advantages and disadvantages of a jury trial with his trial counsel (R1407:420-
21; R5044: 195-96; R456: 6-7). See Add. B & E. Defendant understood that he had a 
constitutional right to a jury of eight persons, whose verdict must be unanimous (R456:5-7). 
He knew that if he waived the jury, only the judge would decide the outcome of the case 
(R456: 5-6).16 Several times, the court asked defendant if he was freely choosing to waive 
a jury and if he had any questions about the waiver (R456: 6-7). Each time, defendant 
16
 Defendant correctly notes that the court was somewhat tongue-tied in describing 
its role: "Do you understand that a jury doesn't hear the evidence in this case, that it is 
tried to me as a judge?" (R456: 7). However, the court immediately clarified its question: 
Q: And that I will be the only person making the decision on the guilt or 
innocence; do you understand? 
A: Absolutely. 
Q: And is that what you want to have happen? 
A: Yes, Your Honor, 
(id.) 
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assured the court his choice was voluntary and knowing (id.). When defendant offered to 
explain why he wanted to waive a jury, the judge injected that she was "not trying to talk 
[him] out of it or into it" (R456: 6).17 
Judge Stirba's conclusion that defendant's jury waiver was knowing and voluntary 
was ultimately substantiated by defendant when he admitted, during the hearing on the 
motion for new trial, that he weighed the alternatives, but chose a bench trial (R454: 29, 50, 
56-57, 144). Additionally, it was validated by Judge Burton when, in denying the motion for 
new trial, he found and concluded that "defendant's decision to waive the jury was a clear 
and informed choice" (R1407: 421-22 & 423; R5504: 195-96 & 198). See Add E. 
Defendant fails to acknowledge his admissions and does not challenge the new trial findings 
and conclusions. Consequently, but for the rule defendant now proposes, it is undisputed that 
defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived a jury trial. 
17
 Defendant argues that his concern that jurors might be inherently racist 
undercuts the validity of his jury waiver; he also argues that the court was obligated to ask 
for and consider his reasons for waiving (Br.Aplt. at 18-19 & 21). Case law is contrary. 
A defendant's fear of undetected jury bias or prejudice is a common and accepted reason 
to waiver a jury. See Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 284 (Utah 1995) (recognizing that 
law-trained judges more readily disregard personal beliefs than jurors and, thus, choosing 
a judge over a jury is almost always a legitimate choice); State v. Maguire, 529 P.2d 421, 
422 n.l (noting that fear of racism is a legitimate reason to waive a jury). See also Singer 
v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) (recognizing that despite safeguards in the jury 
selection process, a jury trial necessarily contains inherent weaknesses and the "potential 
for misuse"); Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942) (recognizing that "[i]n a 
variety of subtle ways trial by jury may be restrictive of a layman's opportunities to 
present his case as freely as he wishes"). 
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(C) The Trial Court Was Not Obligated to Follow Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals Procedure Before Accepting Defendant's Waiver. 
Plain error must be predicated on controlling authority. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that plain error requires error which is both obvious 
and prejudicial); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 n.ll (Utah 1989) (explaining the 
obviousness prong of plain error). Here, defendant acknowledges that Utah law does not 
mandate the rule he advocates (Br.Aplt. at 12). Consequently, defendant's claim of plain 
error necessarily fails. See Id. 
Moreover, even if this Court were to provide prospective guidelines for jury waiver 
colloquies, defendant overstates the Seventh Circuit rule he advocates. 
The so-called Delgado rule directs federal district courts within the Seventh Circuit 
to "explain that a jury is composed of twelve members, that the defendant may participate 
in the selection of jurors, and the verdict of the jury is unanimous" before accepting a waiver 
of a jury trial. United States v. Delgado, 635 F.2d 889, 890 (7th Cir. 1981). Contrary to 
defendant's characterization, this procedure is not constitutionally required, but only 
judicially recommended. See Id. and United States v. Rodriguez, 888 F.2d 519,527 (7th Cir. 
1989); Williams v. DeRobert is, 715 F.2d 1174, 1177-78 (7th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 
U.S. 1072 (1984) (both recognizing that Delgado rule arose from judicial prudence and not 
constitutional necessity). See Singer, 380 U.S. at 36; Adams, 317 U.S. at 277 (both refusing 
to impose strict procedural guidelines regarding jury waiver). If a district court does not 
provide the recommended explanations, the Seventh Circuit Court does not presume 
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prejudice. Instead, the appellate court reviews the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the waiver to determine if, despite the failure to follow Delgado, the jury waiver is otherwise 
voluntary and knowing. See Rodriguez, 888 F.2d at 528; Williams, 715 F.2d at 1177-81. 
See also Marone v. United States, 10 F.3d 65,67 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Robertson, 
45 F.3d 1423, 1431 (10th Cir. 1995); State v. Mitchell, 15 P.3d 314, 320 (Hawai'i 2000); 
State v. Foote, 821 A.2d 1072, 1074 (N.H. 2003) (all acknowledging that there is no set 
constitutional requirement for a voluntary and knowing jury waiver and, consequently, 
whatever procedure is recommended or followed, a totality of the circumstances standard 
ultimately applies). 
Here, the trial court explained that a Utah jury would consist of eight members, whose 
verdict was required to be unanimous. See Add. B. The trial court did not further explain 
the jury selection process to defendant, though subsequently, in denying the motion for new 
trial, the motion court found that "[defendant and Mr. Montgomery discussed the di fficulties 
and benefits of a bench trial as compared to a jury trial . . . [and djefendant decided that 
Judge Stirba would be more favorable than a jury that would not likely be able to relate to 
defendant's background and beliefs" (R1407:420-21; R5044: 195-96). See Add. E. Based 
on this finding, the motion court concluded that with the advise of counsel, defendant made 
a "clear and informed choice" to waive a jury (R1407: 423; R5044: 198). See Add. E. See 
also Williams, 115 F.2d at 1181 (noting additional validity given jury waivers made with the 
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assistance of counsel). Defendant has not acknowledged, much less challenged, the lower 
court's findings and conclusions establishing the validity of his jury waiver. 
Consequently, even if, arguendo, Utah prospectively adopted a Delgado-typs rule, it 
would not change the outcome in cases like this, where the record establishes the voluntary 
and knowing nature of the waiver.18 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED DEFENDANT TO PROCEED 
PRO SE DURING THE HEARING ON THE MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL AFTER HE REJECTED COMPETENT AND CONFLICT-FREE 
COUNSEL 
Defendant privately retained, had appointed, or was offered the services of multiple 
experienced and competent counsel. But for LDA, they were all conflict-free at the time of 
their appointment. See Statement of the Case, supra. David Grindstaff withdrew because 
defendant retained Ron Yengich. Two LDA attorneys withdrew in the pretrial stages 
because they represented one of the victims in a separate case; one LDA attorney withdrew 
in connection with the motion for new trial based on an unspecified conflict with defendant. 
18
 At least one member of the Court has expressed interest in a Delgado-type rule. 
See State v. Garteiz, 688 P.2d 487,488-89 (Utah 1984) (Durham, J. specially 
concurring). However, traditional totality of the circumstances analysis has been 
effective. See, e.g., Moos man, 794 P.2d at 477-79 (upholding jury waiver); State v. 
Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297-98 (Utah 1986) (reversing jury waiver). Moreover, if a 
supervisory rule were imposed, its non-mandatory non-constitutional nature should be 
made clear. See Williams, 715 F.2d at 1178-86 (extensively distinguishing the Delgado 
rule from Sixth Amendment requirements and refusing to "constitutionalize" the rule). 
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The rest—Ron Yengich, Edward Montgomery, Mary Corporon, and Richard Mauro— 
eventually withdrew because, in essence, defendant refused to cooperate with them. See Id. 
Defendant refused the services of Manny Garcia. See Id. At one point, defendant expressed 
a desire to privately retain a Muslim out-of-state attorney, but later represented that even 
though the Pakistan government offered to provide him one, he preferred to 'Tight this thing 
[the motion for new trial] by myself because "I'm capable of doing it myself (R453: 9). 
Defendant was clear why he wanted to represent himself in the hearing on the motion 
for new trial. Beginning pretrial and continuing throughout the proceedings, defendant 
consistently rejected those who disagreed with him. See Statement of the Case, supra. He 
complained when his attorneys did not follow his directions, failed to consult with him before 
filing motions, or criticized his actions. See Id. He believed that his attorneys wanted to 
"silence" him and were mutually involved in a "cover up" and/or conspiracy against him 
(id.). He did not trust the American justice system and called his trial counsel (Montgomery), 
the prosecutor, the victims, and the investigating detective "liars" (R1407: 310, 435-56, 
R449: 5-7). He accused Mr. Yengich of hating him because he was a Muslim (R1407: 346-
56; R449: 8). He viewed the trial judge as fair and non-racist, but turned on her when she 
sentenced him to prison (R1407: 119, 311).19 
19
 After trial, defendant wrote Judge Stirba to express his appreciation for her 
fairness and admitted that if the victims were believed, the evidence supported the 
verdicts (R1407: 119). Later, after he was sentenced to prison, he claimed her death was 
retribution: "I previously assumed that Judge Stirba would grant me justice but instead 
she sold my soul to devils and bought plenty of hell fire for her" (R1407: 345). Such 
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Defendant also wanted to represent himself because he wanted the freedom to express 
his views, including his political concerns (R204: 9-10; R499: 3-5; R453: 7-8; R455: 14). 
When he was represented by counsel, he knew that he could not directly communicate with 
the judge (R1407: 71). If he represented himself, he believed no such stricture applied 
(R1407: 304-05). He did not feel that his attorneys believed in his case (R1407: 304-05; 
R499: 9-10; R455: 12-13). If he proceeded pro se, he would have "a chance to make it [the 
lies] public" and "say what I am going to say" (R499: 5-6, 9-11). 
Defendant expressed his desire to represent himself to Judge Lubeck, who, after Judge 
Stirba died, handled an early post-trial hearing, and Judge Burton, who heard and denied the 
motion for new trial (R1407: 296, 304-05, 370-72, 399,409-10; R204:9-10; R449: 5-6, 11, 
16-21; R452: 12-13; R453: 3-8; R455: 2-15; R457: 6-9). Both judges were familiar with 
defendant's writings and Judge Burton interacted with defendant on several occasions (id. 
& R449: 17; R455:15). Judge Lubeck conducted the initial waiver colloquy, and Judge 
Burton conducted a second inquiry a year later (R449: 3-21;R453:10-17; R455:2-28). See 
Addendum D (Counsel Waiver Colloquies). Both judges concluded that defendant 
voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to counsel (R449: 20; R453: 11, 15). 
Now, for the first time on appeal, defendant claims that the court plainly erred in 
accepting the waiver (Br.Aplt. at 1-2 & Point II). Defendant asserts that he did not 
exchanges were typical of defendant when he disagreed with a person (R1407: 41, 47-53, 
56A, 361-63, 370-72, 374-75, 379-81; R449: 3-6). 
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voluntarily waive counsel, but was forced to proceed pro se because his attorneys were 
"disinterested" in the case (Br.Aplt. at 26-39). He claims that his choice to proceed pro se 
was not knowing because the colloquies did not fully conform to those recommended in State 
v. Frampton, 737P.2d 183,187-88 (Utah 19S7) (Br.Aplt. at 42-46). See infra, n.23. Finally, 
defendant argues that the court's acceptance of the waiver necessarily prejudiced him 
because if he had counsel during the hearing on the motion for new trial, he would have 
established that his trial counsel's failure to call an expert locksmith adversely impacted the 
outcome of the trial (Br.Aplt. at 48-49). Defendant's claims have no merit. 
(A) Defendant Rejected the Offer of Competent and ConfllcUFree Counsel. 
Because defendant expressly declined the offer of counsel, "he has the burden of 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not so waive his right to counsel." 
State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, U 74,63 P.3d 731. Accord State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, If 
22, 979 P.2d 799. This requires that defendant establish that (1) he did not voluntarily 
decline an offer of competent, conflict-free counsel, and that (2) he did not knowingly elect 
self-representation. See Id. Further, because defendant did not object below, he must now 
establish plain error in the court's acceptance of his waiver.20. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT 
33, If 41, 488 Utah Adv. Rep. 14. 
20
 Defendant acknowledges that even if successful, he is only entitled to a new 
evidentiary hearing with the assistance of counsel, not a new trial (Br.Aplt. at 27). 
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Defendant attempts to meet his burden by arguing that his rejection of counsel was 
"not entirely voluntary" because he was "required to chose between counsel disinterested in 
the case, and proceeding pro se" {Br.Aplt. at 39 & 27-41). The claim has no record support. 
Below, defendant never claimed that his attorneys were "disinterested." He 
complained that they did not share his view of his motion for new trial, or claimed that they 
were "unduly influenced" by his "enemy," Mr. Yengich. See Statement of the Case, supra. 
See also State v. Wulfenstein, 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah) (reaffirming that a defendant has 
no right to "pick and choose and discharge his court-appointed counsel at will with a demand 
or expectation that the court will appoint a new one"), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 803 (1987). 
Ms. Corporon drafted and filed the motion for new trial (R1407:202-16). Defendant 
complained that she did not consult with him in its drafting and did not incorporate all of his 
arguments; however, he was allowed to present arguments beyond those in the written 
motion (R453:7-8). When Ms. Corporon withdrew, defendant disclaimed knowing why she 
wanted to withdraw, but later accused her of improperly trying to curtail his anti-Mormon, 
anti-American outbursts. See Statement of Case, supra.. Ms. Corporon explained that she 
withdrew for ethical reasons and because defendant refused to cooperate with her.21 See Id. 
Defendant postulates that Mr. McCaughey was unprepared and disinterested {Br.Aplt. 
at 28 & n. 6). When Mr. McCaughey withdrew, he briefly explained what lead to defendant's 
21
 Defendant implies that Ms. Corporon withdrew over money {Br.Aplt. at 27-28 
n.5). This is misleading. When she moved to withdraw, Ms. Corporon simply explained 
that defendant was indigent and entitled to appointed counsel (R448: 10). 
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rejection of him. Mr. McCaughey reviewed the pleadings, the findings and conclusions in 
support of the verdicts, and the motion for new trial and memoranda, and then told defendant 
that he did not believe the motion for new trial would succeed. See Statement of the Case, 
supra. Defendant immediately asked him to withdraw. See Id. Mr. McCaughey did not 
represent that he had completed his preparation for the hearing and did not suggest that the 
trial transcripts were not necessary. To the contrary, he told the court that defendant was 
entitled to the transcripts and then arranged for their preparation and delivery to defendant 
at the prison before he withdrew (R1407:298,340,343; R449:3-4). In sum, the record does 
not support defendant's assertion that Mr. McCaughey was derelict. 
Similarly, defendant suggests that the prosecutor improperly tried to remove standby-
counsel (Mr. Mauro) and that Mr. Mauro did not meet with defendant {Br.Aplt. at 33). The 
record does not support the suggestion. Once, shortly after he was appointed, Mr. Mauro 
did not appear (R1407: 353; R453: 3). The prosecutor asked defendant to clarify if he was 
willing to proceed without counsel for purposes of that hearing (R453: 3). In the same 
hearing, defendant said Mr. Mauro had not met with him (id.). Six months later, when Mr. 
Mauro withdrew, the attorney verified that he had met with defendant, discussed the motion 
for new trial, hired an investigator, and was in the process of preparing for hearing when 
defendant filed his bar complaint. See Statement of the Case, supra. Again, the record does 
not support that Mr. Mauro was "disinterested." 
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Three days after Mr. Mauro's withdrawal, the court offered to appoint Manny Garcia, 
but defendant refused his assistance (R1407: 405, 409-10; R435: 2-10). The refusal had 
nothing to do with Mr. Garcia's interest in the case; the problem was that because he had just 
been appointed, he needed time to review it. See Statement of the Case, supra. Defendant 
objected: he was ready to proceed and saw no reason for more delays.22 See Id. 
Defendant's suggestion that the court forced defendant into proceeding without 
counsel is equally without support. See Br.Aplt. at 35 n. 9. The court offered to continue the 
motion hearing if defendant accepted Mr. Garcia's assistance, but if as defendant suggested, 
"today was the day," Mr. Garcia was not ready through no fault of his own (R455: 2-10). 
Subsequently, during the same hearing, the court realized that defendant's witnesses were 
not subpoenaed and continued the evidentiary hearing after agreeing to assist defendant in 
subpoenaing them (R455: 25-27, 39-45). The court did not pressure defendant; it 
accommodated him. 
In sum, defendant was offered multiple competent and conflict-free attorneys, but 
expressly rejected their assistance. Consequently, defendant waived his right to counsel 
22
 Defendant argues that he did not voluntarily waive counsel because he asked for 
substitute counsel, i.e., a Muslim attorney (Br.Aplt. at 31). This distorts the record. 
Defendant knew he was not entitled to the appointment of a Muslim out-of-state attorney, 
but hoped that his family might privately arrange for one (R449: 16-19). He was 
provided time to arrange it (id.). Subsequently, defendant told the court that the Pakistan 
government offered to provide him with Muslim representation, but he wanted to proceed 
pro se(R453: 9). 
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unless he now establishes that the trial court plainly erred in concluding that the waiver was 
voluntary and knowing. 
(B) The Court Did Not Plainly Err in Allowing Defendant to Proceed Pro Se. 
Defendant claims that even if he expressly rejected counsel, the colloquies failed to 
fully comply with Frampton and, therefore, the court plainly erred in concluding that 
defendant's waiver of counsel was voluntary and knowing (Br.Aplt. at 42-47). The argument 
is without merit. 
The Sixth Amendment grants a criminal defendant the right of self-representation as 
well as the right to counsel. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 15. When a defendant expresses 
a desire to proceed pro se, the trial court must question him to ensure that he is knowingly 
and voluntarily relinquishing his right to counsel. See Id. at ffl| 15-23. This Court 
recommends a 16-point colloquy.23 See Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f 70. But compliance with 
the recommended colloquy is not dispositive; instead, the test is whether, under the totality 
of the circumstances, the waiver is knowing and "expressly made with 'eyes open.'"/*/, at 
H 15 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). In other words, the record 
23
 In Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188-89, the Court recommended sixteen questions 
concerning a defendant's understanding of the rules of evidence and procedure, and their 
application to the hearing in question; his past experience, if any, in self-representation 
and his understanding that the court cannot advise or assist him; his knowledge of the 
crimes and penalties; his understanding that his testimony must proceed by question and 
answer; and the voluntariness of his choice. It also directs trial courts to warn against 
self-representation and to consider the appointment of standby counsel if the defendant is 
allowed to proceed pro se. 
27 
must establish that the defendant was provided with sufficient information to make a choice, 
even if that choice is not an intelligent or wise one. See State v. VanCleave, 2001 UT App 
228,f 17 n.6, 29 P.3d 680, cert, denied, 40 P.3d 1135. 
Defendant analyzes isolated questions in the colloquies to support his claim of error 
(Br.Aplt. at 42-46). Such an approach does not fairly consider the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the waiver as required by controlling case law. See Arguelles, 
2003 UT l ,f 70; Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 17-25. When placed in context, the court properly 
concluded that defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived counsel.24 
Judges Lubeck and Burton were aware that defendant was a Pakistani national who 
had resided in the United States for 10 years (R1407: 56,308,315). Defendant obtained one 
college degree in Pakistan and a second degree in Idaho, though he worked as a taxicab 
driver in Utah (R1407: 315; R449: 16). He was fluent in both written and spoken English 
and did not require a translator. He was married to an American and had sufficient family 
support that he was able to twice pay "thousands of dollars" and hire private counsel (R1407: 
24
 Consideration of the totality of the surrounding circumstances is particularly 
appropriate in this case, where a year elapsed between the first and second colloquies, 
during which time defendant continued to seek self-representation. See discussion, 
supra. Additionally, in the same hearing, immediately following the second colloquy, 
defendant "outlined" his rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, argument and laid 
"foundation" for his exhibits (R455: 17-71). See Add. A. A month after this, defendant 
represented himself in the evidentiary hearing (R1407: 415). Consequently, the court had 
much more than the bare colloquies from which to judge the voluntary and knowing 
nature of defendant's waiver of counsel. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ffif 15-26 (analyzing 
waiver of counsel in context of entire case history). 
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345-56; R449: 5-7). He was also appointed multiple attorneys at state expense and was 
provided transcripts at state expense. See Statement of the Case, supra. Through his wife, 
he had assembled a "report" entitled "Travesty of Justice," which protested his innocence, 
summarized the case, and criticized the justice system (R1407:306-35; R449:45; Exhibit 7). 
The report had been freely distributed to the judges assigned to defendant's case, the media, 
the governor of Utah, and the Pakistani Consulate General in Los Angeles, California (id.). 
Defendant filed documents with Judges Lubeck and Burton and appeared before Judge 
Burton on other occasions. See Statement of the Case, supra. Both judges expressly 
considered defendant's past conduct, knowledge, and intelligence in judging the validity of 
his waiver (R449: 17, 20; R455: 15). At the same time, both judges warned defendant that 
he would be at a disadvantage in representing himself (R449: 17-28; R455: 12-13). 
Defendant was not law-trained and had not previously represented himself, but he 
spoke extensively to Mary Corporon about rule 24 and the limitations it placed on a motion 
for new trial (R449: 16-18; R453: 10;R455: 12-13,20-23,27,64). He could quote the rule 
verbatim and understood its requirement of substantial prejudicial error; he also recognized 
that a discretionary standard applied to a motion for new trial (id. & R453: 7-14). He 
recognized that until the new trial motion was resolved, deportation was unlikely and an 
appeal precluded (R448:15;R449:7;R455:12). He discussed the merits of the motion with 
Ms. Corporon, Mr. McCaughey, and Mr. Mauro (R204: 4; R453: 10, R449: 3). 
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Defendant planned on using Mary Corporon's new trial motion as a ''guideline," but 
would present additional arguments within the context of rule 24 (R449: 16; R453: 7-14). 
Defendant recognized his need for trial transcripts and also wanted transcripts of the hearings 
leading up to the evidentiary new trial hearing (R449:4; R452: 7-8,28,31; R453: 21; R455: 
18). He properly requested subpoenas for his witnesses and recognized his right to call 
adverse witnesses, including the prosecutor and the investigating detective (R457:6-8; R455: 
3-5). He had read the prosecutor's response to the motion for new trial and believed he could 
refute it with logic and a showing of ineffective counsel (R453: 7-8, 11-14). 
Defendant claims, for the first time on appeal, that the court plainly erred in accepting 
his waiver because the court did not anticipate an evidentiary hearing and did not question 
defendant accordingly (Br.Aplt at 44). Defendant is incorrect. While Judge Lubeck early 
on assumed the motion would be resolved with legal argument, Judge Burton, a year later, 
knew an evidentiary hearing was required and discussed this with defendant, including what 
witnesses he wanted subpoenaed and the general parameters of his argument (R449: 20; 
R453: 5-7, 17; R457: 2-9; R455: 39-45, 65-71). Defendant exhibited a clear understanding 
of evidentiary hearings based on his own trial experience—indeed, at one point, defendant 
expressed surprise that the investigating detective was not present in the courtroom since he 
was exempted from the exclusionary rule (R453: 5-6). 
Nevertheless, defendant now claims that he did not understand that he could testify 
during the motion for new trial (Br.Aplt. at 44). The claim is disingenuous: defendant 
30 
testified in his own trial and compelled his opposing counsel (the trial prosecutor) to testify 
at the evidentiary hearing (R450: 13-186; R454: 65-70, 83-101). Moreover, in light of 
defendant's arguments (ineffective counsel and newly discovered evidence), there appears 
little reason for defendant to have testified at the evidentiary hearing. In any case, defendant 
fully expressed facts and personal views throughout the new trial proceeding—for as 
defendant acknowledged below, acting pro se provided him with more freedom to express 
his views (R1407:304-05). Indeed, when he had been represented by counsel, defendant felt 
he had a *;rope tied" around his neck, which the lawyers continually tightened (R449: 4-5). 
In sum, the waiver of counsel colloquies fairly conformed with Frampton's 
recommendations. The voluntary and knowing nature of defendant's waiver was further 
supported by defendant's extensive and skilled interactions with the court. Consequently, 
defendant has failed to establish any obvious error in the court permitting defendant to do 
what he wanted—to stop dealing with attorneys and to proceed pro se. 
(C) Defendant Has Not Established that He Was Prejudiced. 
As defendant acknowledges, even if he, arguendo, established obvious error, he must 
still establish that the error was prejudicial (Br.Aplt. at 47-50). See Casey, 2003 UT 33, «[j 
41. Here, defendant's claim of prejudice may be summarily rejected. 
Defendant argues that his trial attorney (Montgomery) was deficient in deciding not 
to call a locksmith to discredit the Millers' account of the damage to their door (Br.Aplt. at 
47-50). He also claims that if he had realized no expert would testify, he would not have 
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waived a jury (Br.Aplt. at 49-50). Defendant asserts that but for the waiver of counsel at the 
evidentiary hearing, he would have established that the failure to call a locksmith adversely 
impacted the outcome of his trial {Br.Aplt. at 50). 
Essentially the same arguments were presented and rejected during the hearing on 
defendant's motion for new trial. Defendant claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to call a locksmith as an expert witness. See Statement of the Case, supra. Mr. 
Montgomery explained he had investigated this possibility, but the locksmith he contacted 
supported the State's case. He decided that even if he found an expert favorable to the 
defense, an inconclusive battle of the experts might ensue (R454: 41-43, 48, 114, 118-19). 
He opted instead to attack the Millers' testimony by pointing out its inconsistencies (id.). 
The court found and concluded that trial counsel's decision was legitimate and did not 
constitute ineffective counsel (R1407: 421-22, 424; R5044: 196-97, 199). See Add. E. 
Defendant does not challenge this ruling on appeal—he impermissibly ignores it. 
Defendant's claim, that he would not have waived the jury if he had known no expert 
witness would testify, is equally unsupported by the record. During the hearing on the 
motion for new trial, defendant explained that he considered his defense as a whole in 
waiving the jury, but did not claim that his decision would have been different if he had 
known that no expert would be called (R454: 29, 144). Instead, as found by the motion 
court, defendant and his trial counsel decided that based on defendant's apprehension of a 
Utah jury and Judge Stirba's reputation for fairness, a bench trial might be more beneficial 
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to defendant (R1407: 311, 420-21; R5044: 195-96; R454: 29, 50, 57, 144). See Add. E. 
Again, defendant simply ignores this finding. 
* * * 
In sum, defendant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he did 
not waive counsel or that the court plainly erred in concluding that the waiver was voluntary 
and knowing. See Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f 74. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's multiple convictions for aggravated burglary and 
assault. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A3^day of January, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
Statutes, Rules, Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (2003) 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24 (2003) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1999) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1999) 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.) 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public tnal, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROLhDuna 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel The defendant shall be 
personally present at the trial with the following exceptions 
(a)(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, 
defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence, 
(a)(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, 
the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to 
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from 
being tned and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall 
have the same effect as if defendant had been present, and 
(a)(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from 
trial for good cause shown which may include tumultuous, 
notous, or obstreperous conduct 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require 
the personal attendance of the defendant at the tnal 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tned in the 
following order 
(b)(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody 
(b)(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody, 
(b)(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recogm 
zance, and 
(b)(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail of 
recognizance 
(c) All felony cases shall be tned by jury unless the defen-
dant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the court 
and the consent of the prosecution 
(d) All other cases shall be tned without a jury unless the 
defendant makes wntten demand at least ten days pnor to 
trial, or the court orders otherwise No jury shall be allowed in 
the tnal of an infraction 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a tnal jury shall 
be as specified in Section 78-46-5, U C A 1953 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the 
consent of the accused and the approval of the court, by 
stipulation in wnting or made orally in open court, proceed to 
tnal or complete a tnal then in progress with any number of 
jurors less than otherwise required 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the tnal 
shall proceed in the following order 
(g)(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defen-
dant stated, 
(gX2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening 
statement and the defense may make an opening statement or 
reserve it until the prosecution has rested, 
(g)(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the 
charge, 
(g)(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may 
present its case, 
(g)(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evi-
dence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits, 
(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other 
appropnate time, the court shall instruct the jury, and 
(gK7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either 
side or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall 
open the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecu-
tion may close by responding to the defense argument The 
court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel 
for each party and the time to be allowed for argument 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified dunng 
tnal and an alternate juror has been selected, the case shall 
proceed using the alternate juror If no alternate has been 
selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number 
of jurors remaining Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged 
and a new tnal ordered 
d) Questions by jurors A judge may invite jurors to submit 
wntten questions to a witness as provided in this section 
(i)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the 
judge shall control the process to ensure the jury maintains its 
role as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an 
investigative body The judge may disallow any question from 
a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time 
(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the 
judge should advise the jurors that they may wnte the 
niiAatirtrt act if ruvMira Kn f K o m and Q l l h m i t frh#» flUPStlOn t o t h e 
(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and 
unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection to the 
question The judge may disallow a question even though no 
objection is made The judge shall preserve the wntten ques-
tion in the court file If the question is allowed, the judge shall 
ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party 
to ask it The question may be rephrased into proper form The 
judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to exam 
me the witness after the juror's question 
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury 
to view the place in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, or in which any other matenal fact occurred, it 
may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of 
an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some 
person appointed by the court for that purpose The officer 
shall b* <?worn that while the mrv are thus conducted he will 
suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak 
to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the 
trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delav 
or at a specified time 
(k) At each recess of the court whether the jurors are 
permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admon-
ished by the court that it is their duty not to converse among 
themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be 
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial and 
that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon 
until the case is finally submitted to them 
(1) Upon retmng for deliberation, the jury may take with 
them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have 
been received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in 
the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury such 
as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband The court 
shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request Jurors are 
entitled to take notes dunng the tnal and to have those notes 
with them dunng deliberations As necessary the court shall 
provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on 
taking and using notes 
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury thev 
shall be kept together in some convenient place under charge 
of an officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged 
unless otherwise ordered by the court Except by order of the 
court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow 
any communication to be made to them or make any himself, 
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict and 
he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to 
any person the state of their deliberations or the verdict 
agreed upon 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire 
to be informed on any point of law ansmg in the cause they 
shall inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communi-
cate such request to the court The court may then direct that 
the jury be brought before the court where in the presence of 
the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the 
inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be 
given Such response shall be recorded The court may in its 
discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having 
the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry 
and the response thereto shall be entered in the record 
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face 
it nay be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, 
or the jury may be sent out again 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution or 
at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an 
order dismissing any information or indictment or any count 
thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally 
sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser 
included offense 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own 
initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is 
any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and 
upon notice. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or 
evidence of the essential facts in support of the motion. If 
additional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence 
the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such 
time as it deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days 
after imposition of sentence, or within such further time as the 
court may fix during the ten-day period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same 
position as if no trial had been held and the former verdict 
shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or in 
argument. 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-5-102. Assault . 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, 
that causes bodily injury to another or creates a substan-
tial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to an-
other; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowl-
edge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused 
caused serious bodily injury to another. aoos 
76-6-203. Aggravated burglary* 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempt-
ing, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or 
another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the 
crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dan-
gerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the 
same definition as under Section 76-1-601. 1989 
Addendum B 
Jury Waiver Colloquy 
(R456:5-8) 
savar at that time. 
MR. MONTGOMERY: That doas not work for ma, Your 
Honor• 
THE COURT: It doas not? Okay. 
Marci, do you hava another tima. 
THE CLERK: Friday tha 28th at 8:30. 
THE COURT: All right. And do I hava tha Jury 
Instructions, voir dira and — 
MR. MONTGOMERY: Wa can provida them further. My 
cliant is willing to waiva a jury trial; and tha Stata is in 
concurrence with that. 
THE COURT: I see. All right. 
Mr. Hassan, if you would — I'd like to have you 
sworn in. Would you please raise your right hand? 
(Defendant sworn.) 
All right. Mr. Hassan, do you understand that as a 
criminal defendant in both of these trials you have the right 
to have a jury of eight people to decide the outcome of the 
case? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And that if this were to be tried to the 
jury — and that that is a constitutional right that you have. 
All right. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That if this were to proceed to a trial 
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter 
by jury, a vardict of guilty would raquira an unanimous 
vardict of all aight jurors; do you undarstand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yas, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. And I undarstand that you 
wish to waiva your right to a jury trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yas, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you undarstand that maans that you'd 
ba giving up your right to a jury trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yas, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And is that what you want to do, giva up 
your right to a jury trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yas, Your Honor, I do. I hava 
soma raasoning for that — 
THE COURT: Pardon ma? 
THE DEFENDANT: I hava soma raasoning for making that 
decision. I hava writtan something down. It's difficult to 
ma, but these things I hava --
THE COURT: Wall, let ma ask you this: I want to 
maka sura that you understand what you are doing and that you 
are giving up your right to a jury trial knowingly and 
voluntarily and with full understanding of what you are giving 
up. I am not trying to talk you out of it or into it. I'm 
just trying to make sure you understand what you are doing. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You talked about this decision to give up 
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter 
your right to jury trial with counsel? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is anyone pressuring you to give up your 
right? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you doing it of your own free will? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about — do you 
understand that a jury doesn't hear the evidence in this case, 
that it is tried to me as a judge. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And that I will be the only person making 
the decision on the guilt or innocence; do you understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: And is that what you want to have happen? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Any questions about it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Not any questions about this thing. 
THE COURT: All right. I'm focusing on the jury 
trial issue right now. Okay, I'm just focusing on that. 
You might have questions about other aspects of the 
trial, but if you have any questions about giving up the right 
to a jury trial, now is the time to ask me. 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor, I don't. 
THE COURT: All right. Based on your testimony, I 
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find that you have knowingly, voluntarily and with full 
understanding of your rights given up your Constitutional 
rights to a jury trial, and the case will proceed to the Court 
beginning on May 1st, and I'll schedule three days for that. 
In lieu o£ that, then jury instructions are not 
needed. We will begin the trial at 9:30 in the morning. 
Are there any motions in limine? 
MR. MONTGOMERY: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
And Mr. Parker for the State, the State is also 
giving up its right to a trial by jury? 
MR. PARKER: We are, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MONTGOMERY: I think we can — if it helps the 
Court at all, I don't think it is going to take three days. I 
think we can do it in two or perhaps less than that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Well, I do want to talk about whether Mr. Hassan 
would feel comfortable with an interpreter. I know that he 
communicates very well in English, but given the pace of the 
trial does your client require an interpreter present? 
MR. MONTGOMERY: I don't think so. We've discussed 
it, and I don't think so. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Is there any other matter that we need to attend to 
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter 
Addendum C 
Findings & Conclusions - Verdicts 
(R1407:182-87; R5044:127-32) 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
PAUL B. PARKER, 5332 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, I 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
Plaintiff, LAW, AND ORDER OF CONVICTION 
-vs-
Case No. 9919H407FS and 991915044FS 
REHAN HASSAN, 
Hon. Anne M. Stirba 
Defendant. j 
On May 15, 2000, this matter came before this Court for trial. The State was represented 
by Paul B. Parker, Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney. Defendant was present and represented 
by Edward R. Montgomery. The State called as witnesses Carol Miller, J.D. Miller, Kathy 
Harris, Officer Bruce Evans and Detective Brad Burmingham. The Defendant testified and also 
called as a witness Abdou Bah. Photographs of the door of the Miller's apartment were admitted 
into evidence. Following the evidence both sides presented closing arguments. 
Having listened to the witnesses and having admitted the evidence and after having 
considered the arguments, this court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FfNPtNQS OF FACT 
1. On May 29,1999, J.D. and Carol Miller lived in an apartment located at 550 East 
300 South #1, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Defendant lived in the same apartment building directly across the hall from the 
Millers in apartment #2. 
r "• 
ay. / 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER OF CONVICTION 
Case No. 99191407FS AND 991915044FS 
Page 2 
3. The Millers were hired to assist in taking care of the apartment building. They 
received a reduction in the amount of their rent for their services. 
4. Sometime prior to the 29th, the electrical power to defendant's apartment was shut 
off by the power company. 
5. To get power inside his apartment, defendant ran an electrical cord from his 
apartment out into the common areas of the building and plugged the cord into a 
electrical outlet. 
6. The power for the outlets in the common area of the apartment building waspaid 
for by the building owners and defendant did not have permisson to use the power 
for his own apartment. 
7. On the 29lh of May, the Millers found the electrical cord from defendant's 
apartment and J.D. unplugged it. 
8. Defendant became upset when he found the cord unplugged. 
9. Around 8:30 p.m., defendant went to the Millers' apartment door and confronted 
Carol about the cord. 
10. Carol did not let defendant inside but rather left him standing in the hall outside 
the door. 
i i. A verbal argument followed and eventually Carol shut the door. 
12. Defendant became upset and kicked at the outside of the door several times until 
the door flew open. 
13. Defendant entered the apartment with the intent to assault Carol and/or J.D. 
14. Defendant told Carol that he was going to kill her and J.D. and then he grabbed 
Carol by the arm and threw her to the floor. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER OF CONVICTION 
Case No. 99191407FS AND 991915044FS 
Page 3 
15. Defendant's actions in grabbing Carol and throwing her to the floor caused Carol 
pain and caused a small bruise on her arm. 
16. Defendant left the apartment. 
17. The Miller's closed the door and tried to secure it. 
18. About ten minutes later, Defendant again broke through the Miller's apartment 
door. 
19. Defendant entered with the intent to assault Carol and/or JD. 
20. Defendant went to one of the bedrooms where Carol Miller was dressing. 
21. Defendant again threatened to kill Carol. Defendant also grabbed Carol and 
pushed her to the floor. 
22. Defendant then went to J.D. and hit him in the face and grabbed his hair. 
23. One of J.D.'s teeth was broken by the blow. 
24. Defendant then left. 
25. Defendant returned a third time. 
26. This Court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that he had a gun as he entered 
the apartment that third time. 
27. On June 3, 1999, Kathy Harris was working with her son outside the apartment 
building at 550 East 300 South. 
28. Kathy is the wife of Ed Harris. Ed is the manager of the apartment building. 
29. Kathy assists her husband in managing the building. 
30. Carol approached Kathy and told her that defendant had plugged another power 
cord into the common area outlets. 
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31. Kathy approached defendant's front door and saw an extension cord running 
across the hall connecting defendant's apartment with a common outlet in the 
hallway. 
32. Kathy knocked on defendant's door. 
33. Defendant answered the door. Kathy explained that she was Ed Harris1 wife and 
that defendant could not use the apartment building's power in his own apartment. 
34. Defendant knew that Ed Harris was the apartment manager. 
35. Kathy did not enter or attempt to enter defendant's apartment. 
36. Kathy did reach down to unplug the power cord from the hallway outlet. 
37. Defendant immediately hit Kathy in the mouth, shoved her against the wall across 
the hall and began to kick her repeatedly. 
38. Defendant's blows caused Kathy pain and soreness. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The elements of the crime of Burglary are: entering or remaining unlawfully in a 
building with the intent to commit an assault. 
2. The elements of the crime of Assault are: an act committed with unlawful force or 
violence that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
3. The elements of the crime of Aggravated Burglary are: in attempting, committing, 
or fleeing from a burglary the actor causes bodily injury to any person not a 
participant in the crime or uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the crime or possesses or 
attempts to use a dangerous weapon. 
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4. A dangerous weapon is defined as any item capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury; or a facsimile or representation of the item; and the actor's use or 
apparent intended use of the items leads the victim to reasonably believe the items 
is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury or the actor represents to the 
victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item. 
5. Bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical 
condition. 
6. Serious bodily injury means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
7. Defendant's first entry into the Miller's apartment with the intent to commit an 
assault on the Millers meets the elements of Burglary. 
8. Defendant's acts of grabbing Carol Miller and throwing her to the floor caused 
bodiliy injury to Carol Miller and meets the elements for Assault as charged m 
count IV of case 991911407. 
9. Defendant's acts that caused bodily injury to Carol Miller occurred while 
defendant was in the commission of burglary of the Millers' apartment, therefore 
the elements have been met of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count number 
II of case 991911407. 
10. Defendant's second entry into the Miller's apartment with the intent to commit an 
assault on the Millers also meets the elements of Burglary. 
11. Defendant's acts during the second entry of hitting J.D. Miller in the face and 
pulling his hair caused bodily injury to J.D. Miller and meets the elements for 
Assault as charged in count V of case 991911407. 
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12. Defendant's acts causing bodily injury to J.D. Miller occurred during defendant's 
commission of burglary of the Millers' apartment and therefore meets the 
elements of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count number I of case number 
991915044. 
13. Defendant's acts hitting Kathy Harris in the mouth and kicking her caused bodily 
injury to her and therefore meets the elements of Assault as charged in count III 
of case 991911407. 
14. Defendant's entering the third and final time does not meet the element of 
Aggravated Burglary as charged in count I of case 991911407. 
QRPER 
Having made the above findings of fact and conclusion of law, IT IS THEREFORE 
ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that defendant is guilty of counts II, III, IV, V of case 
991911407 and of count I of 991915044. IT IS ALSO ADJUDGED AND ORDERED 
that defendant is not guilty of count I of 991911407. 
DATED this 26th day offctfay, 2000 
BY THE COURT: 
ANNE M. STIRBA, District Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Edward R. Montgomery 
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Waiver of Counsel Colloquies 
(R449:3-21; R453:10-17; R455:2-28) 
1 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: Good morning. Welcome. This is State of 
4 Utah vs. Rehan Hassan, case No. 991911407. Are you Mr. Hassan? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Hassan is present with his attorney 
7 Steve McCaughey. The State is here with Mr. Parker. This is 
8 the time calendared for oral argument on a motion for a new 
9 trial, which was filed by Ms. Corporon, on Mr. Hassan's behalf, 
10 back in August of last year. Mr. McCaughey? 
11 MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, initially we have a 
12 couple of problems here. One, I have spoken with Mr. Hassan, 
13 and he indicates that he would like to have — a couple things 
14 he wants to have. He wants to have the transcript of the trial 
15 before this argument proceeds. 
16 I have talked to him a little bit about the issues in 
17 the argument, and told him, while we can argue these issues, I 
18 don't believe they are particularly meritorious issues. His 
19 concern seems to be more with the political nature of this 
20 case, as opposed to the factual nature. And so his desire, his 
21 expression to me was that if I didn't agree with his take on 
22 the case, then he probably should represent himself. I told 
23 him that I am not a politician, I am a criminal lawyer, and my 
24 evaluation, without having seen the trial transcripts, but with 
25 having seen the findings of fact prepared by Judge Stirba, and 
1 reviewing the documents filed by the numerous attorneys in this 
2 case, that he and I probably didn't agree on the best way to 
3 approach this case. And so he would like to have the 
4 transcripts ordered. I think he is entitled to that prior to 
5 the argument for the new trial. But I think he wants to 
6 represent himself, and I would ask permission to withdraw. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Parker, what is your position? 
8 MR. PARKER: Well, I suppose my only difficulty on 
9 this is this is not the first time the defendant has had 
10 difficulty with his attorney. We have just — 
11 THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey is No. 6. 
12 MR. PARKER: Yes. And we just went again and again. 
13 There has been continuance after continuance of various 
14 motions. None of this is Mr. McCaughey's fault. He is, like I 
15 say, No. 6 on this series of attorneys. Somewhere down there 
16 the defendant is going to have to take responsibility for his 
17 actions, and work with the appointed attorneys that he has. We 
18 are prepared. This motion has been filed almost a year ago. 
19 The issues are fairly clear. We both filed responsive motions 
20 I on it. I think we need to proceed as soon as we can. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Hassan, let me address you directly, 
22 then. You heard Mr. McCaughey, what his request was on your 
23 behalf. That's what you want to do, you want to put this off, 
24 obtain the transcript, and argue it, yourself? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. If I could explain 
1 a few more things, be on the record right now. The trial 
2 transcripts are the key for my case. I have been asking for 
3 them. Now, if you said I had problems with my attorneys, the 
4 problem was there, apparently, Mary Corporon ended up filing a 
5 memorandum without my consent, without my consultation, without 
6 my approval, and she did whatever she wanted to do. She took 
7 whatever money she wanted to when she dropped the case, 
8 whenever she felt it right. How could somebody present me 
9 without going through my case? That is as clear as daylight. 
10 I No attorney can really, like Mr. McCaughey, cannot know,about 
11 I my case until they know that the key to success to my case is 
12 my trial transcripts. 
13 As far as the religious or political issues 
14 concerned, yeah, I am waiting, I consider my case to be on the 
15 same grounds as Laurie Berensen, and I am a victim, not a 
16 criminal. My wife has been suppressed. I have not been given 
17 an opportunity at all by Judge Stirba to express myself. I was 
18 all the time under pressure, if I speak, the attorneys kept 
19 telling me not to say anything, not to say anything, if I 
20 speak, it is like a rope tied on my neck, and it will get 
21 tighter, and I will end up spending more time in prison and all 
22 those things. 
23 My case has been and is as clear as daylight, open 
24 discrimination. There is no doubt about it. Mr. Yengich 
25 totally messed up the case. I will — one by one, I am willing 
1 to explain all the attorneys what they did to me. All it is, 
2 I it is 100 percent cover up. I want to be given a chance to 
3 make it public. We have tried all avenues, me and my wife, 
4 worked day and night. 
5 There are a lot of things Mr. Parker has done which 
6 are definitely very cruel of him and very evil of him. I have 
7 reason to say that this person is an enemy of Islam. This 
8 person is a racist. This person has made my life and my wife's 
9 life hell. I care less if I live or if I die, anymore. I am 
10 fighting for the sake of my religion, for the sake of my 
11 dignity, my family value. My religion has taught me a few 
12 things, to stand against injustice. And I will fight this case 
13 to the last drop of my blood. If, like the Board of Pardons 
14 has decided let me go next year, October, if this case wound 
15 up, is being proceeded more than that, sir, I don't want to 
16 get — I don't want to spend the rest of my life in prison. I 
17 don't mind if you want to put me on death row. My arm has been 
18 broken. These people have tortured my life day and night. I 
19 don't want to get overemotional. This is a hypocrisy. This is 
20 a lie. This is an attack on my religion. That's all what it 
21 is. 
22 The door was never broken. How in the earth I could 
23 go inside. These people keep on lying, Mr. Parker keep on 
24 lying putting those false witnesses on the stand, never gave me 
25 a chance to explain myself. Detective Burningham, 100 percent 
1 lied. I gave him the phone number. He didn't call the 
2 witness. What is my fault in that? I have been tortured. I 
3 am on medication now. I have been going through nervous 
4 breakdowns now. I believe Mr. Parker should be put into 
5 prison. This person should be put into prison, and Detective 
6 Burningham should be put into prison. Luckily, Judge Stirba is 
7 not alive anymore, and may God do justice whatever she did to 
8 me. 
9 I am not willing to give in at all, at any cost, no 
10 matter whatsoever. I love my wife. I want to be with her. If 
11 you force me to take deportation, that won't work. I will make 
12 it to — if anything happens to me, I am going to tell you very 
13 clearly sir, I am not a terrorist, I am not a criminal, I am a 
14 victim here. But if you guys want to go to the point you want 
15 to torture an innocent person on the basis of his religion, the 
16 basis of his beliefs, the basis of the way he looks, or because 
17 I have married a Mormon wife, and people hate me for that, and 
18 just because she does not even know if the Mormon religion is 
19 right or wrong. I have nothing against the Mormon religion. 
20 My religion tells me to respect all the religions. I have 
21 respected all the religions. I do have my opinions on Mormon 
22 religion. I still have the right of speech. But I have not 
23 said anything bad. I have been told by Judge Stirba to stop my 
24 wife from approaching the way she is approaching. She is 
25 approaching me when I go through a nervous breakdown. She 
1 wrote me. I have everything in documentation. 
2 Sir, please, give me a chance to explain at least 
3 once myself. I know you don't like what I am saying. Give me 
4 a chance to explain what I am saying. This is very important 
5 for my own physical, mental health. But if anything would 
6 happen to me, then the consequences, I am not saying, you know, 
7 whatever, but then my appeal is to the Muslims. All the 
8 Muslims are here. You know the situation in any land. And all 
9 the Pakistanis over there, what are they doing? If you want 
10 something to get started in this country, feel free for,that. 
11 Torture me more, put me in prison. 
12 Sir, please don't interrupt me right now. 
13 MR. McCAUGHEY: I didn't. 
14 THE DEFENDANT: I thought your gestures were bad. 
15 You are a friend of Yengich. Yengich has totally betrayed me. 
16 I Mr. Yengich is an evil person. He is an enemy of Islam, too. 
17 He has written me the letters, which I have everything in 
18 record. My wife has everything in record. Judge Stirba wrote 
19 me the letter, going back to the conversation, stop your 
20 wife — sir, can I get some water, please — stop your wife 
21 from approaching her or her husband. What do I have to do with 
22 my wife? How could I stop her? How could I stop her from 
23 doing amything which she — I don't have — I cannot stop her 
24 physically. I am in prison. I have no control of my wife. 
25 She is a free person. She has the right of free speech. She 
1 felt with her heart, her heart felt good, she know what we have 
2 been through. She believes in my innocence. She can do 
3 whatever she wants to. It is not against the law to make my 
4 case public. My wife has been suppressed again and again and 
5 again. All attorneys told me not to say a single word, 
6 including Mary Corporon. 
7 These things need to be brought out, into the light. 
8 I am saying all these things for my own government. I want all 
9 this documentation to be sent to my government in Pakistan, 
10 eventually it is going to go to some religious leaders in 
11 Pakistan and all over. I would be a martyr if something 
12 happens to me. I consider myself as a symbol of Islam who has 
13 stood for justice and right. My attorneys have tortured me so 
14 much. Mary Corporon told me not to make it a political issue, 
15 not to make it a religious issue, not to approach anybody, not 
16 to petition. Why? What is there to hide? What is there to 
17 hide? I have nothing to hide. 
18 I Mr. McCaughey is saying I don't have any chance to 
19 win my trial, or my appeal. If that's the approach, after 
20 knowing all that I have been through, then he is not a 
21 competent attorney at all. He does not know my case. He is 
22 the same as Ron Yengich. Ron Yengich did not bother to even 
23 walk next door to him, to Mr. Parker's office, in spite of my 
24 numerous, numerous appeals to him. I have letters. I wrote 
25 him so many letters, for God's sake, go and find the evidence. 
1 Where the heck is the evidence? I need to see it. I am losing 
2 my sleep. I have not'done it. 
3 These people, I have heard stories they are cable of 
4 going back and breaking the door which is not broken. 
5 Fortunately, all the people saw it. If the door is not broken, 
6 and the witnesses say it again and again, how am I guilty? How 
7 in the earth did the judge find me guilty? Judge Stirba is an 
8 evil judge. I am going to say it. I don't mind if you torture 
9 me or whatever. You guys want to start a holy war, let's go 
10 for it. 
11 But I am innocent. And this case will go, you know, 
12 I would not take any torture or whatever. I am willing to die 
13 I on a dignified life, if my blood can bring a revolution toward 
14 an evil system in these courts and misuse and abuse of power, 
15 which I have experienced a lot in the prison system, too, they 
16 will stop me again and again from saying my prayers, they have 
17 tortured me a lot, and I have — my arm has been broken, I 
18 became handicapped for the rest of my life just because 
19 I Mr. Parker decided to put me in prison, just because he has no 
20 other way to cover his evil deeds up. And I have — before 
21 that, it was different, the rope was tied. Now there is no 
22 rope tied. I am going to say what I am going to say. I 
23 strongly believe that nobody cam help me or harm me, but God. 
24 If he does not will, you people cannot do anything to me. That 
25 I is my belief. That is where I stand. 
1 I want to represent myself. I want to take care of 
2 my kids. I want to be given an appropriate chance to prepare 
3 my case. I want my trial transcripts to be given a copy to me. 
4 And, I don't know, the other, I want my parents to get a copy 
5 I in Pakistan, because they are approaching the press over there. 
6 That is a key for my innocence. And I have told my father to 
7 write a book, just like Laurie Berensen's mother has written a 
8 book. She was in NASA, and said something common between me 
9 and — my mother and her, that she is also a physicist. And 
10 Laurie Berensen has been tortured. I have been following her 
11 case very clearly. Whatever she is saying, same as my plea. 
12 I am standing against injustice. I have had enough. 
13 I have racism in this country. 10 years I have been here. I 
14 have seen enough. And there has to be a stop. Life is not 
15 worth living after this. Mary Corporon told me Judge Stirba 
16 only put me to prison because she is pissed, or she was -- I 
17 should say — she was pissed because I wrote her some letters. 
18 And what wrong did I write in those letters? My letters should 
19 I be sent out to public, everything I have written should become 
20 public. I have not written anything bad. I have not 
21 threatened anybody. People told me that I made threats. I 
22 made threats? This is the biggest lie of the century. I have 
23 never threatened nobody. How dumb or stupid do I look? In 
24 prison, I am going to threaten the judge or somebody? You guys 
25 I don't have a clue. I am not an ignorant person. People know 
1 I me of my intelligence, of my smartness, of the way I am, my 
2 heart is. This person comes and says whatever he wants to. I 
3 have been putting with Mr. Parker for a long, long, long time. 
4 He is just trying to get reelected to become a district 
5 attorney or something. That's the reason he is doing it, to 
6 just get the fame. He is 100 percent enemy of Islam. If the 
7 justice won't be served, then my blood be on his shoulders, and 
8 I on Mr. Detective Burningham's hands. I am willing to die. 
9 That's all, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Hassan, have you taken any steps to 
11 obtain this trial transcript? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I went to my attorneys. 
13 THE COURT: Who? Which attorney? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Mary Corporon. She never contacted 
15 me. They don't reply my calls. Every time I ask them 
16 something, they find am excuse to drop my case. I asked Heidi 
17 Buchi to do the same thing. I kept on begging her, I need the 
18 trial transcripts. She dropped my case, for no reason 
19 whatsoever. I believe she dropped my case because I said that 
20 I Mr. Gilbert Athay, who is, apparently, on the board list 
21 something, has also betrayed me, because he was willing to take 
22 my case, but Mr. Yengich used his undue influence on him to not 
23 let him take my case. And same Mr. Yengich is doing with Mr. 
24 McCaughey. I know that. Mr. McCaughey say Yengich is a very 
25 good friend of his. Mr. Yengich has a lot of power. And I am 
1 against- the power. Mr. Yengich, to me, has not done anything 
2 good other than just betray me. And I am not afraid of 
3 I Mr. Yengich. I care less. 
4 I am sorry, I will go to the point. I understand 
5 what you ask me. I just have too much inside of me. So can I 
6 drink a little more water? I am on medication. 
7 THE COURT: I am just trying to get at the timing of 
8 this. If you are going to get a transcript and have another 
9 argument, I am trying to find out when that can be done. You 
10 don't have a transcript now? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, I don't. 
12 THE COURT: Have you made arrangements with whatever 
13 court reporter was here at the trial to get that transcript? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Sir, right now I am indigent, and I 
15 thought that my state-appointed attorney would take care of 
16 them, my transcripts. That's something my parents asked him 
17 when they approached him. 
18 MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, he is indigent. I have 
19 been assigned a conflict contract. I think he is entitled to 
20 those transcripts. 
21 THE COURT: I understand that. I was just wondering 
22 where we were in terms of — 
23 I MR. McCAUGHEY: I don't think anything has been 
24 ordered. 
25 MR. PARKER: I have not seen a motion at all for 
1 them, your Honor. It looks like the reporter was Gayle 
2 Campbell. 
3 THE CLERK: She is retired, but I am sure they have 
4 access to the transcript. 
5 THE COURT: It does seem to me that there is 
6 certainly no harm in getting a trial transcript on a request 
7 for a new trial. Mr. McCaughey, what's your suggestion? Can 
8 you help us do that? Even though Mr. Hassan doesn't want you 
9 to argue his case, do you think you can file the appropriate 
10 motion to obtain a trial transcript? 
11 MR. McCAUGHEY: I can do that. 
12 MR. PARKER: May I suggest, your Honor, that although 
13 there won't be a trial, we are just talking about a motion for 
14 a new trial, I think it behooves us, still, to make sure that 
15 there is a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to 
16 counsel. He has had several. I would ask the Court to advise 
17 him that he will have difficulty representing himself in this 
18 affair. Perhaps if the Court can obtain any experience that he 
19 thinks he has or reason to believe he can do it on his own, and 
20 something to indicate the nature of the proceeding and what he 
21 I is up against. 
22 THE COURT: Well, thank you, Mr. Parker. I had in 
23 mind doing that. I wasn't sure if I was going to do it today 
24 or at the hearing. But I suspect it is a good suggestion to do 
25 that now. 
1 Mr. Hassan, what I am going to do, at your request, 
2 is not hold this argument today. We will get the transcript, 
3 and I will review it. You will have a copy. You will get a 
4 copy of it, as well, of course. And we will set a time to come 
5 back and allow you to argue this motion. I am not going to 
6 appoint another attorney. I am not certain of who has been 
7 hired and who has been appointed. But you have had 
8 Mr. Grindstaff, and Mr. Montgomery, Ms. Corporon, Mr. Yengich, 
9 Ms. Buchi from LDA, and Mr. McCaughey. So I am not going to 
10 appoint another attorney. 
11 You indicate you want to argue it yourself. I want 
12 to talk to you about that a little bit, Mr. Hassan. I have 
13 allowed you to make this statement that you wanted to today. 
14 And I have no problem with that. But you need to understand a 
15 few things about the hearing we will have in the future. We 
16 will set the time in awhile. And that is that it will be an 
17 argument under the rule of law. With all due respect, this 
18 person you mentioned, whose case you are following, enemies of 
19 Islam, leaders of Pakistan, I don't, respectfully, care about 
20 those things. I am interested in whether, under the law, as I 
21 understand it, in the State of Utah, in the United States, you 
22 are entitled to a new trial. So when we come back, that's what 
23 I I am going to restrict you to. 
24 Tell me a little about yourself. I understand you 
25 have a college degree and an MBA, is that correct, or Master of 
1 Public"Administration? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: I have a Master's of Commerce from 
3 back home, and a Bachelor's of Marketing. 
4 THE COURT: Do you have any experience with the legal 
5 system, at all, other than what you have been through in regard 
6 to this case? I know the history of this case, and so on. But 
7 other than this case, do you have any familiarity with the 
8 legal system? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, I don't. 
10 THE COURT: Have you, since you have been, since last 
11 July, have you been studying the law in prison, at all? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
13 THE COURT: Do you understand the Rules of Criminal 
14 Procedure, what is required to demonstrate and what is required 
15 for you to show, to justify a new trial? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: I believe I cam follow some 
17 guidelines of the motion of new trial which was filed by Mary 
18 Corporon, though she did not mention all the facts in that. I 
19 believe that I have smmn what Mr. Parker's arguments is, and I 
20 can very well cover them by reasoning. The only reason I have 
21 I to take charge of this case myself is that I don't have a 
22 Muslim representation. Unless I am entitled to get a Muslim 
23 representation or counsel from outside the state, from Los 
24 Angeles or something, which I don't know, I don't trust the 
25 legal system over here. 
1 THE COURT: You are certainly entitled to hire any 
2 attorney you want to represent you. But I am not going to 
3 appoint anyone else, simply given the history of this case. 
4 Mr. Hassan, you need to understand that, in my opinion, it is a 
5 mistake for you to represent yourself at even this type of 
6 hearing. It is fairly restricted. The things I am going to 
7 consider are fairly restricted. I am simply going to consider 
8 if there are proper grounds that justify a new trial. Many of 
9 the things you have mentioned today, I have seen in writings 
10 that you have provided to the Court, and that Ms. Updike, at 
11 least they are signed by Elizabeth Updike, have provided to the 
12 Court, the case history and so on. Many of the things you have 
13 said, I have seen in some form or close to that form. Most of 
14 those, Mr. Hassan, will not be considered in this argument. So 
15 I think it is a mistake for you to pursue it yourself. But you 
16 are certainly entitled to represent yourself, and the Court and 
17 our legal system can't force an attorney upon you. But you 
18 should only do that and I will only allow it if I am convinced 
19 that you are able to do that. 
20 Now, it is obvious to me, not only from just your 
21 education, but from seeing the history of this case and seeing 
22 you here today, and hearing you, that you are an intelligent 
23 person. But I don't know that you have a full grasp of what 
24 Rule 24 is of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is 
25 the rule that dictates what is required to be shown to justify 
1 a new trial. 
2 But, Mr. Parker, anything else that you think I ought 
3 to inquire about with Mr. Hassan? I understand there is that 
4 case State vs. Fr amp ton. I haven't read it for some time. I 
5 should comply with in terms of allowing someone to represent 
6 themselves. Any other suggestions? 
7 MR. PARKER: I also haven't read Fraxspton for awhile. 
8 I think the Court, basically, covered it. I understand 
9 Fraapton required the Court to indicate the difficulty, of some 
10 of the problems, make a strong recommendation that he dp it, 
11 himself, consider his experience and his intelligence, and I 
12 think the Court has done all of that. I think it is sufficient 
13 to allow Mr. McCaughey to withdraw, and allow him to represent 
14 himself. 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, may I? 
16 THE COURT: Yes, go ahead. 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Considering what you told me, 
18 considering especially what you told me about getting a Muslim 
19 counsel, my understanding was — I don't have much knowledge of 
20 the legal system. It is extremely hard to get an attorney 
21 outside Los Angeles — outside Salt Lake or Utah. And I was 
22 trying to get an attorney from Los Angeles. I don't want to 
23 waste the time of the Court, and I am in prison, anyway, if it 
24 is appropriate, I could be given like a month or so, and I can 
25 make a final attempt with my parents and my consulate general 
1 and see if I can hire a Muslim counsel within a month or month 
2 and a half or something, if possible. If not, then I am 
3 willing to. 
4 THE COURT: Someone give me their best estimate, if 
5 Ms. Campbell has retired, when do you think a transcript can be 
6 available? Anyone? 
7 MR. PARKER: I would suggest we set it for a couple 
8 of months. I guess it was just a day. 
9 THE COURT: Then brought back the next day for the 
10 ruling. 
11 THE DEFENDANT: It was scheduled for two days, but it 
12 took only one day. 
13 THE COURT: I don't know if Ms. Campbell is still 
14 around. I am assuming she is. My experience, generally, is we 
15 could get that transcript and so on within 30 days or so, 
16 assuming she is around here. So what I am going to do, 
17 I Mr. Hassan, is schedule a hearing about 60 days away from now. 
18 If you can hire your own attorney, you can give that attorney 
19 this date. If you can't or don't, then you be prepared to 
20 argue that, yourself. We will get that transcript to you as 
21 soon as it is available. I can't say when that is. I think 
22 everyone is at a bit of a disadvantage as far as knowing 
23 exactly when we can get that. But that would still be ample 
24 time for you to prepare for that. 
25 I So I will find that Mr. McCaughey has a basis to 
1 withdraw, and I will allow him to withdraw. I will find that, 
2 for the purposes of this argument, where there will not be 
3 evidence presented, where there will simply be argument, and 
4 you were present at the trial and testified at the trial, that 
5 you, Mr. Hassan, are able to represent yourself at that 
6 hearing. And I will allow that. Believing, as I do, that you 
7 are capable of arguing and understanding Rule 24, basically 
8 have to show that an injustice was done at the trial. 
9 1 So I will allow you to represent yourself. I will 
10 ask Mr. McCaughey, before he leaves, to do whatever he can to 
11 file the necessary papers to order that transcript. And then 
12 he will be off the case. The transcript will come to you. 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, just I want to apologize 
14 the heat which was coming, with all due respect, you know, I 
15 have nothing against someone in particular or something. But I 
16 I do want to say that, for the heated argument, heated things 
17 which have been inside of me, what I said, but there is no 
18 offense, I don't want you to take any offense towards you or 
19 something, please. 
20 THE COURT: I don't easily take offense, Mr. Hassan. 
21 But at the argument I will again expect you to confine yourself 
22 to those things that are relevant. But I am not going to cut 
23 you off, probably. Don't worry. Let's get a date about 60 
24 days away. 
25 THE CLERK: We could do that the morning of 
1 October 11. 
2 MR. PARKER: That's fine with the State, your Honor. 
3 THE CLERK: That would be at 8:30. 
4 MR. PARKER: October 11 at 8:30? 
5 THE CLERK: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: If, Mr. Hassan, we run into trouble and 
7 don't get a transcript about 30 days before that, then we will 
8 make sure you know about it. But we may have to change that. 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, just the last thing, I 
10 would also like my transcripts — I know it is not the Court's 
11 responsibility, but I want the transcripts to be given to my 
12 parents. I am willing to pay the cost. The only thing, it 
13 would take a little bit more time. I don't know if the Court 
14 can directly send the transcripts, because they are working on 
15 my case. And also I need all my — all the material 
16 Mr. McCaughey has on my case. 
17 THE COURT: I am sure Mr. McCaughey will return that. 
18 As far as transcripts to anyone else, you will have to take 
19 care of that. You can certainly get a copy to your wife or 
20 anyone else you would like, and they can take care of that. We 
21 will see you back here on the 11th at 8:30. Again, if there is 
22 any difficulty with this transcript, we will certainly keep you 
23 advised of that. 
24 
25 
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THE COURT: UH-HUH. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'M GOING TO BE VERY CLEAR, THIS IS 
NOT A THREAT AT ALL, THIS IS MY FEELING, THIS IS THE WAY I 
PERCEIVE BECAUSE OF, I WANT JUSTICE TO PREVAIL ONE WAY. I'M 
SIMPLY ASKING FOR JUSTICE. I'M NOT SAYING, GET MY RELIEF 
BECAUSE THEY HAVE OFFERED ME MY RELIEF ALL THE TIME, I'M NOT 
TAKING IT. I'M JUST SAYING I NEED JUSTICE. SO KEEPING THAT IN 
MIND, I DON'T WANT FURTHER DELAY, I WANT YOU TO PLEASE 
UNDERSTAND THAT THE TIME IS OF A REAL SENSE RIGHT NOW AND THE 
EARLIER IT'S DONE THE BETTER IT WOULD BE. THESE ATTORNEYS, IF 
THEY CAN BE CONTACTED AND THEY CAN COME, WHATEVER NEEDS TO BE 
DONE, WE CAN ALL WORK IT TOGETHER TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE 
SITUATION. I CAN TELL HIM WHERE I'M COMING FROM SO HE CAN GET 
HIMSELF PREPARED. 
THE COURT: WHY DON'T YOU DO THAT. 
THE DEFENDANT: OKAY. SOME OF THE THINGS I WOULD 
SAY, WHICH MARY CORPORON DID MENTION VERY CLEARLY, LIKE YOU 
SAID WE WOULD, YOU KNOW, TALKING ABOUT OTHER THINGS, THE 
BIGGEST THING IS RULE 24 OF UTAH CRIMINAL PROCEDURES. AND IT 
SAYS, "IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE IF THERE IS ANY ERROR OR 
IMPROPRIETY," CAN YOU UNDERSTAND ME OKAY? "IMPROPRIETY WHICH 
HAD A SUBSTANTIAL ADVERSE EFFECT UPON THE RIGHTS OF A PARTY." 
AND THEN THERE ARE A COUPLE OF THINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN SAID ON 
SOME OTHER CASES WHICH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED, STATE V WILLIAM, 
STATE V SMITH. OKAY. 
11 
THERE ARE FOUR GROUNDS WHICH I AM APPLYING FOR. THEY 
ARE VERY CLEAR. THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT THEM. THERE IS 
NOTHING PECULIAR OR HIDDEN ABOUT THEM. 
THE FIRST GROUND, THE REASON FOR A NEW TRIAL, AND 
YOUR HONOR, I'M SORRY, I'M NOT TRYING TO REMIND YOU OF YOUR JOB 
OR WHATEVER, I'M SAYING THERE ARE THREE OUTCOMES WHICH I 
PERCEIVE OF THIS HEARING. ONE IS THAT I DON'T GET GRANTED THE 
RETRIAL. THE OTHER IS I GET GRANTED A RETRIAL. THE THIRD ONE 
IS, WHICH IS CONSIDERING THAT JUDGE STIRBA IS DECEASED RIGHT 
NOW, THE THIRD IS THAT EVERYTHING GETS DISMISSED AGAINST ME. 
AND I'M KEEPING ALL THOSE OPTIONS IN MIND. 
THE REASON FOR RETRIAL, ONE OF THEM, THE FIRST ONE IS 
THE NEW EVIDENCE WAS FOUND, MY ALIBI WITNESS. MR. PARKER, I 
WILL COME TO HOW HE'S APPROACHING THAT, THAT SHE WAS NOT ALIBI 
WITNESS, AND WHATEVER, I WILL COME TO THE POINT IN A SECOND. 
AND HE ALSO SAID THAT NEW EVIDENCE WAS NOT NEW 
EVIDENCE, I KNEW IT BEFORE, AHEAD OF TIME. THAT IS NOT THE 
CASE. THAT IS NOT THE TRUTH. 
THE OTHER ONE IS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSELS. 
THERE ARE A LOT OF LIES. I HAVE BEEN KEPT IN DARK FOR A LOT OF 
THINGS. THE KEY WITNESSES HAVE BEEN DITCHED OUT OF DEBT. THE 
WAY WE PERCEIVE THINGS, THE WAY WE WANTED TO PRESENT IT, WAS 
NOT PRESENTED THE WAY IT WAS. I WILL ADDRESS IT IN A LITTLE 
BIT. 
THE THIRD ONE IS A SURPRISED LIE FROM THE ALLEGED 
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VICTIMS. 
THE COURT: A SURPRISED LIE? 
THE DEFENDANT: LIE, YEAH. I DON'T KNOW HOW TO 
PHRASE IT IN A LAW TERM, BUT THERE'S SOMETHING LIKE THAT'S A 
SURPRISE LIE WHICH IS AS CLEAR AS DAYLIGHT. THESE PEOPLE 
REPEATEDLY LIE AND JUDGE STIRBA, OR THE BIGGER JUDGES, JUDGE 
BURTON, COULD NOT PICK IT UP. THE WAY IT IS IS THAT THE THING 
WHICH I'M CHARGED WITH IS BY ANY LAW OF PHYSICS, ANY LAW OF 
SCIENCE, ANY LAW OF LOGIC IS IMPOSSIBLE. IT IS 100 PERCENT 
IMPOSSIBLE. I CAN PROVE THAT. I WAS GOING TO PROVE THAT AT 
THE TIME. WE ARRANGED EVERYTHING BUT MY ATTORNEY DID NOT DO 
IT. AND I AM AS CONFIDENT AS I'M SITTING OVER HERE THAT I CAN 
PROVE IT, THAT THESE THINGS ARE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO BURGLARIZE 
SOMEBODY CONSIDERING OTHER FACTORS. 
AND THE FOURTH ONE IS THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, 
WHICH GOES TO MR. PARKER. THE FIRST THING IS HE KNEW THAT THE 
STATE DID NOT HAVE CASE, HE KNEW FROM THE VERY FIRST DAY, THE 
POLICE KNEW FROM THE VERY FIRST DAY. MR. BURNINGHAM KNEW FROM 
THE VERY FIRST DAY. MR. BURNINGHAM LIED QUITE A BIT TOO. AND 
I WILL DO MY BEST TO PROVE -- THE PROBLEM IS, YOUR HONOR, I 
DON'T KNOW WHO BELIEVES IN GOD AND WHO DOESN'T BELIEVE IN GOD 
NOWADAYS. THEY CAN LIFT THEIR HAND AND SAY WHATEVER THEY WANT 
TO SAY AND JUST SIT UP HERE SURPRISES ME HOW EASILY THEY LIE. 
SO I DON'T KNOW WHAT ELSE WOULD MAKE SOMEBODY TELL THE TRUTH. 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, OTHER THAN, BUT THERE ARE A 
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LOT OF OTHER THINGS, BUT THE KEY THING WHICH I WOULD MENTION IS 
MY RE-INCARCERATION, WHICH WAS WHEN I WAS PUT BACK INTO THE 
CUSTODY A SECOND TIME AND MY BAIL WAS RAISED SIX TIMES TO 
125,000.00. I WAS NOT A THREAT, YOU KNOW, BUT FOR WHATEVER 
REASON MR. PARKER AND MR. BURNINGHAM CONVINCED JUDGE BURTON 
THAT I AM A THREAT TO SOCIETY. CONSIDERING THAT I DON'T HAVE A 
VIOLENT PAST, NOT EVEN CONSIDERING WHATEVER THE PAST YOU SEE, 
WHAT YOU SEE SOMETIMES IS NOT THE TRUTH. THE DEPOSITION WAS 
NOT FOUND ON THOSE THINGS. THE THING WHICH YOU HAVE FOUND SOME 
CHARGE ON WAS THE SAME REASON I TOOK A PLEA BARGAIN BECAUSE I 
DIDN'T WANT TO WASTE MY TIME, THE KIND OF CHARGE WHICH' I HAD 
FOR DISTURBANCE OF PEACE, OR SOMETHING. THAT IS NOT A MAJOR 
CHARGE ANYWAY. 
THE RE-INCARCERATION, THE WAY IT AFFECTED, I'M GOING 
TO EXPLAIN IT TO YOU, THE WAY IT AFFECTED, IS MALEENA, AND I 
WILL CALL HER ALIBI WITNESS, BECAUSE ACCORDING TO MR. PARKER 
ALIBI WITNESS IS THE ONE WHICH TELLS THAT THE PERSON WAS NOT 
THERE PRESENT, PHYSICALLY PRESENT, AT THE SPOT OF CRIME AT THAT 
CRITICAL TIME. THAT IS EXACTLY HIS DEFINITION. 
AM I RIGHT, MR. PARKER? 
MR. PARKER: HM-HM. 
THE DEFENDANT: WHAT I'M SAYING IS THAT SHE SAYS SHE 
WAS WITH ME AT THE TIME. SHE SAYS EVERYTHING, HOW WE WENT OUT, 
FOR HOW LONG I WENT OUT, I CAME BACK, AND SHE PUTS ME IN MY OWN 
APARTMENT AT THE TIME. THAT MEANS I WAS NOT IN THE OTHER 
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PEOPLE'S APARTMENT. THAT IS AN ALIBI WITNESS BY ANY SENSE OF 
LOGIC. IF A WITNESS IS SAYING I WAS NOT ON THE OTHER SIDE OF 
THE DOOR, I WAS ON THIS SIDE OF THE DOOR, THAT MAKES ALIBI 
WITNESS. 
WHAT HAPPENED WAS, I HAPPENED TO, WHEN I WAS OUT FOR 
A WEEK, I HAPPENED TO GET HOLD OF MALEENA A DAY OR TWO BEFORE 
ALL THIS HAPPENED. I GOT REINCARCERATED. I KNOW THERE'S SO 
MANY THINGS, I AM TRYING TO CONFUSE THE COURT HERE. FIRST 
THING WHAT HAPPENED WITH MR. BURNINGHAM HAS CLEARLY LIED ABOUT 
IS WHEN HE CAME ON FRIDAY, THE 4TH OF JUNE, 1999, WHEN I WAS IN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL, I WAS IN THE SUICIDE SECTION SO I COULD 
NOT MAKE ANY CALLS OR NOTHING. I WAS TOTALLY BANNED FROM 
EVERYTHING. I HAD NO WAY TO GET AHOLD OF MALEENA AT THAT TIME. 
MR. BURNINGHAM CAME THE NEXT DAY OF MY INCARCERATION, THE FIRST 
INCARCERATION, AND I TOLD HIM EVERYTHING. I WAIVED MY RIGHT TO 
MIRANDA AND I TOLD HIM THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED, THIS IS WHAT 
HAPPENED AND EVERYTHING, AND HE SAID IF YOU HAVE NOT DONE IT WE 
DON'T WANT YOU IN HERE. I CLEARLY TOLD HIM ABOUT MY ROOMMATE 
AND I CLEARLY TOLD HIM ABOUT MALEENA. 
IN THIS TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS HE HAS SAID CLEARLY THAT HE 
WAS NOT ABLE TO GET HOLD OF HER. THEN HE SAID THAT I NEVER 
GAVE HIM THE PHONE NUMBER. HE WAS NOT ABLE TO GET AHOLD OF 
HER. HOW, IF I WOULD NOT HAVE GIVEN HIM THE PHONE NUMBER, HOW 
WOULD HE GOT HOLD OF SOMEBODY NAMED MALEENA? BECAUSE THAT'S AS 
CLEAR AS DAYLIGHT, CRYSTAL CLEAR, THAT I DID GIVE HIM THE PHONE 
„ I 
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NUMBER. AND I EVEN MENTIONED IT, I STILL REMEMBER THE PHONE 
NUMBER. AND I MENTIONED IT IN THE TRIAL TOO. I HAVE GOOD 
MEMORY, YOUR HONOR. I REMEMBERED ALL THOSE THINGS. PEOPLE 
THINK I'M MAKING THINGS UP BECAUSE OF THAT BUT THAT IS KNOWN 
FACT. 
HE ALSO PROMISED ME THAT HE WOULD COME BACK ON 
MONDAY, THE FOLLOWING MONDAY. HE NEVER DID. HE ALSO WAS 
SUPPOSED TO BE INVESTIGATING THE CASE A LOT MORE IN DETAIL, 
FINDING ALL THE PHYSICAL, AND HE HAS CLEARLY MENTIONED, I DON'T 
HAVE THE POLICE REPORTS BUT HE CLEARLY MENTION OVER HERE THAT 
HE NEVER WAS ABLE TO GET TO ANY OF THE PERSON, ANY OF MY 
ALLEGED VICTIMS. AND NOTHING AT ALL. AND STILL THEY END UP 
FILING CHARGES WITHOUT ANY REASONING, WITHOUT FINDING OUT 
ANYTHING, THAT ANYTHING IS BASED ON TRUTH. 
ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ONLY WITNESS I HAD, HE HAD 
NEVER EVEN GONE TO HER. 
YOUR HONOR, YOU TELL ME WHAT KIND OF CIRCUMSTANCE 
DOES IT MAKE, YOU TELL ME A NAME OF A PERSON, YOU SAY GO AND 
CONTACT MR. MAURO OR SOMETHING, OR WHATEVER THIS ATTORNEY'S 
NAME IS, YOU'RE TELLING ME TO GO AND CONTACT HIM, AND WITHOUT 
GIVING ME THE ADDRESS OR PHONE NUMBER OF THE PERSON, YOU TELL 
ME, HOW COULD I FIND THAT PERSON? MR. BURNINGHAM CLEARLY SAID 
I WAS NOT ABLE TO CONTACT HER. I HAVE GIVEN HIM THE PHONE 
NUMBER. WHY WOULD NOT I GO — IT'S JUST LIKE TOTALLY LOGICAL. 
WHAT HAPPENED WAS, NOW I AM GOING TO COME BACK, I WAS 
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ABLE TO GET AHOLD OF MALEENA A DAY BEFORE MY SECOND 
INCARCERATION. SHE TOLD ME, I ASKED HER, I SAID, SHE WAS NOT 
NERVOUS, SHE IS A FOREIGN STUDENT AND STUFF, SHE WAS RELUCTANT, 
WHATEVER I SAID, YOU KNOW, THIS IS GETTING A BIG ISSUE, YOU 
WERE WITH ME, ALL YOU HAVE TO DO IS TESTIFY AND STUFF LIKE 
THAT. SHE SAID, I HAVE TO GO TO WORK RIGHT NOW, WHEREVER SHE 
WAS WORKING, WHY DON'T WE GET TOGETHER IN A COUPLE OF DAYS. 
AND I SAID FINE, YOU KNOW. I WAS WORKING AND DRIVING MY CAB 
TOO. 
NEXT DAY I CAME OVER HERE IN FRONT OF JUDGE ATHERTON 
AND WAS PUT BACK INTO THE JAIL. WHATEVER, YOU KNOW, HER PHONE 
NUMBER, DID NOT ACCEPT COLLECT CALLS OR WHATEVER, BUT THE THING 
IS, I COULD NOT GET HER. NOW THEY TELL ME WHOSE FAULT IS THIS. 
MR. PARKER IS THE ONE WHO CONVINCED, OTHERWISE THAT WITNESS 
WOULD HAVE COME IN FRONT OF IT. MR. PARKER WAS THE ONE, OR 
MR. BURNINGHAM DID PUT ME INCARCERATION AGAIN, WHICH WAS 
EXTREMELY ILLEGAL, I WOULD SAY, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO REASONS. 
I WANT TO KNOW WHAT REASONS. ALL THEY DID IS LIKE PERCEIVE A 
PICTURE INTO A CERTAIN MIND THAT MAYBE I'M A TERRORIST OR 
SOMETHING, WHATEVER THEY WANT. THIS PERSON IS A DANGEROUS 
INDIVIDUAL, HE'S THIS, HE'S THAT, BLAH, BLAH, BLAH. AND LIKE 
STATE ALWAYS DO, JUDGES, YOU KNOW, YOU GET PAID BY THE STATE, 
AND ALWAYS TAKE THE STATE'S SIDE. AND THIS IS AN OPEN FACT. 
EVERYBODY KNOWS ABOUT IT. THAT IS THE REASON I'M TIRED OF YOU 
USING THE SYSTEM, OR WHATEVER. 
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OTHER THAN I TRIED TO CONTACT MALEENA AFTER THAT 
SEVERAL TIMES WHEN I GOT OUT AGAIN, AFTER ONE MONTH, THROUGH 
RON YENGICH. I WENT TO HER HOUSE, I CALLED HER PHONE NUMBER, 
IT WAS DISCONNECTED, THEN WE TRIED SO MANY TIMES, EVEN WHEN I 
MARRIED MY WIFE AND STUFF LIKE THAT, ME AND MY WIFE TRIED TO 
FIND HER, WE DID EVERYTHING TO FIND HER. MY FATHER-IN-LAW DID 
EVERYTHING. THESE PEOPLE ARE ALL THE WITNESSES. THEY DID 
EVERYTHING TO FIND HER. WE COULD NOT FIND HER. ALL WE COULD 
FIND IS HER ROOMMATE WAS LIVING ON THIS VISA THAT SHE LEFT 
SOMEWHERE TO CALIFORNIA OR SOMETHING. THEY DON'T EVEN SPEAK 
MUCH ENGLISH BECAUSE THEY'RE... 
I DON'T KNOW HOW FAR I SHOULD GO OFF INTO THAT 
DIRECTION. 
THE COURT: I THINK IF YOU GIVE MR. PARKER, AS YOU'VE 
DONE, A LITTLE OVERVIEW OF WHAT YOU'RE GOING TO DO THAT HELPS 
HIM KINDA BE PREPARED. I THINK OUR NEXT STEP MAYBE IS TO GET A 
DATE AND MAKE SURE MR. MAURO AND/OR MR. SIKORA GET TO YOU SO 
THAT THEY CAN BE READY, I WOULD THINK. ISN'T THAT OUR BEST 
BET? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: I MEAN, AT THIS JUNCTURE WE'LL JUST BE 
TALKING ABOUT WHAT MAY OR MAY NOT HAPPEN AND WE WON'T MAKE AS 
MUCH HEADWAY — 
THE DEFENDANT: YOUR HONOR, JUST I UNDERSTAND WHERE 
YOU'RE COMING FROM AND I'M NOT LIKE — IF YOU GIVE ME A FEW 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Garcia, are you ready? 
MR. GARCIA: Yes, your Honor, I'm here—I've been 
called here on the Hassan— 
THE COURT: Oh, you have, huh? 
MR. GARCIA: Yes. 
THE COURT: Well, he's probably back there. 
Okay. Mr. Garcia? 
MR. GARCIA: What's going on, Judge? 
THE COURT: Well, the best I could know is, j.f I 
understand it right, Mr. Hassan, you had an attorney named 
Mauro and Mauro got accused by you of stealing stuff. The Bar 
took your complaint seriously and is now chasing Mr. Mauro. 
Mr. Mauro has to withdraw because you've made it so that he 
can't represent you. 
And so I guess, Mr. Garcia, you must be one of the 
conflict attorneys? 
MR. GARCIA: I am. 
THE COURT: So, you're here because Mr. Hassan sort 
of needs an attorney, but I don't know, do you want one, Mr. 
Hassan? I'm never really sure what you want. 
MR. HASSAN: Okay. Your Honor, the way it stands 
right now, I'm (inaudible) I go through that letter of— 
THE COURT: What letter? 
R 455: 2 
MR. HASSAN: You don't get the letter? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. HASSAN: What letter? Okay. 
I—I wrote you the one letter— 
THE COURT: Recently? 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah, recently. 
THE COURT: You told me you wouldn't do that 
anymore, 
MR. HASSAN: I know. That's what I wrote in the 
letter, that I didn't have a choice once you dropped the case 
and all, and I told you what—what I'm planning to do., 
THE COURT: I don't know that I saw—I haven't seen 
that. 
MR. HASSAN: Okay. Well, then I— 
THE COURT: And I wouldn't be sitting in here if I 
dismissed it? 
MR. HASSAN: Okay. Then, my—because— 
THE COURT: What's the letter say? 
MR. HASSAN: It basically says that—that what 
happened with—with Mauro and stuff, you know, and I didn't—I 
didn't have a choice to—other than writing you and letting 
you know what my intentions are. And— 
THE COURT: What are you intentions right now? 
MR. HASSAN: My intentions are, for right now is to 
go ahead and—and—and go to proceedings right now, whatever I 
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have already because I have delayed my Board of Pardon date 
and stuff like that and it's been going on for too long. And 
if it goes—because if I—I get approved or I don't get 
approved, whatever it is, you know, I—I need to just go ahead 
and—with the proceedings today. 
THE COURT: Do you want Mr. Garcia to help you? 
MR. HASSAN: He might not be familiar with my case 
so I— 
THE COURT: I'm certain he—I'm certain he knows 
nothing about it. 
MR. HASSAN: He— 
MR. GARCIA: I don't even know that much. 
THE COURT: Huh? He doesn't even know nothing— 
nothing. 
MR. GARCIA: Right-
THE COURT: He's here because as people who took 
Mauro off, told him to come and fill in, so he doesn't know, 
he can't help you— 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. That's what I'm saying. I am 
ready with the proceedings, with whatever little bit 
(inaudible) because Mauro is not here, you know. I'll—I'll 
mention it to you, but we need to get going now, you know, 
it's— 
MR. GARCIA: Where are we in the proceedings? 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Mauro was investigating, if I 
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understood right, you had given him the name of a couple of 
witnesses that will support some things that you thought had 
gone awry. 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. But then—then— 
THE COURT: And then he tracked down one of them and 
was looking for the others when you said he stole some of your 
stuff. 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. But that's (inaudible) and I 
have reasons for what he did, I took—told him not to deceive 
me and be—be reasonable and be up front with me and I told 
him to—I gave him documents, made four copies to (inaudible) 
and continued request, you know, I have a 4:00 o'clock 
hearing, I need those documents, he—he won't give it back to 
me. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HASSAN: And that's where the problems occurred, 
you know. I didn't have a choice but to go to the Utah State 
Bar. 
At this point in time, that—that handicap is going 
to be there that we don't have the—those witnesses on—on the 
stand or something but I (inaudible) and I can—I can proceed 
to court with what I have and will. 
THE COURT: Do—I mean, I guess I don't mind you 
going ahead. I don't know that—were you thinking we were 
going ahead today? 
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MR. PARKER: Well, it's actually set for a motion 
for—for the motion, but no, I didn't suspect that we were. 
The motions have been filed. I would suggest that maybe we 
take a little time for counsel to talk to the defendant and 
gather a little information, at least help him make that 
decision before we do proceed. 
MR. GARCIA: Well, he wants to represent himself? 
You want— 
THE COURT: He's kind of on and off wanted to do 
that, but it was—it's a motion for a new trial and I.wasn't 
sure Mr. Hassan was going to navigate the waters as well as he 
could. 
MR. HASSAN: You know, I — 
THE COURT: And I don't want to take away his right. 
I mean, if he wants t o — 
MR. HASSAN: Like I said, I—I wrote you the letter 
and I was under the presumption that you had read that letter 
and that it was agreed with the State— 
MR. PARKER: I didn't— 
MR. HASSAN: —that I'm ready to proceed with— 
THE COURT: I thought we were done with letters, 
so. • • 
MR. HASSAN: Okay. Well, I—I understand what, you 
know, has happened, but the way I am right now, whatever 
things 'cause if the thing don't go the way I want it, then I 
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want to the appeal process and then—maybe then—(inaudible) 
Garcia—maybe then Garcia—or Mr. Garcia or something, you 
know, can—can help me but I want to get done with this step 
right now. 
MR. GARCIA: You're on parole? 
MR. PARKER: No. 
THE COURT: No. He's in—he's got two one to 15— 
MR. PARKER: Five to life. 
THE COURT: Five to life, yeah, I guess, two first 
degree felonies. I think they're aggravated— 
MR. HASSAN: Aggravated burglary, yeah. 
But your Honor, I— 
THE COURT: And he had a bench trial in front of 
Judge Stirba and was found guilty; is that— 
MR. PARKER: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Is my memory right? 
MR. PARKER: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And sentenced to the—I think they're 
concurrent; right? 
MR. HASSAN: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. PARKER: You shake a memory that's been too 
long. 
THE COURT: Five to life. 
MR. PARKER: Correct. That is correct. 
THE COURT: So, he has five to life on— 
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MR. GARCIA: So, he was convicted on a bench trial 
and now he's moving to withdraw his pleas? 
THE COURT: No. He's—he's wanting a new trial. 
MR. GARCIA: Wanting a new trial. 
THE COURT: Right. And I — 
MR. GARCIA: Based on— 
THE COURT: — I don't remember— 
MR. PARKER: I have copies of the motion. What 
happened is that he's gone through several attorneys, some of 
the initial ones filed a motion for a new trial, I believe 
that was Mary Corporon, and we've been dealing with that 
motion since. And he's had several attorneys, each wanted to 
investigate and check into the motions— 
MR. GARCIA: I see. 
MR. PARKER: —before actually arguing the motions. 
THE COURT: They don't get too far because Mr. 
Hassan and they— 
MR. GARCIA: Don't get along. 
THE COURT: —have a parting of the ways. 
MR. HASSAN: Conflict. Yeah, I'm a hard person to 
get along with, I'm— 
THE COURT: He's been real nice lately. He got in 
the face of one of the officers at the prison once, but 
lately, he's been really a good guy. He's quit threatening to 
blow me up, that's been a good thing; although I didn't take 
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him too seriously. 
MR, HASSAN: Yeah, you did not. 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. HASSAN: Considering where I am, you know... 
THE COURT: Well, that's kind of where I viewed it, 
yeah. 
MR. GARCIA: Well, I'm probably harder to get along 
with than you are. 
MR. HASSAN: Well, we'll have a good time then. 
Your Honor, like I said, right now, I—I feel 
desperately in the need of getting the proceeding, you know, 
the—done. I'm sorry Mr. Parker is not ready or something, 
'cause these are—we have set the date and I wrote you that 
letter, I—I—you know. 
THE COURT: Because you assumed I'd read it, I 
don't— 
MR. HASSAN: Well, you know what I am saying is that 
because it's a big situation. In order for him to get ready, 
it's going to take him three months more, I'm just ready. 
THE COURT: No question that Mr. Garcia will want to 
spend a little time on it. 
MR. HASSAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: So, do you want to—say you want to go 
on your own? I mean— 
MR. HASSAN: Yes, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: — I think you're clear enough minded, I 
know that you know the process well. Mr. Garcia would be 
happy to help you. 
It would take a little while. I mean, I think Mr. 
Garcia would be reluctant to say, yeah, let's go today, 
there's a lot at stake for you and then Mr. Garcia has a—a 
duty to do the very best he can. So— 
MR. GARCIA: I have an obligation to be competent. 
THE COURT: Yeah. And so you can—he can't go ahead 
today and help you. I don't think he could ever take.that 
position. 
MR. GARCIA: I know. That's what I'm saying. I 
would— 
THE COURT: So, in your mind, if today is the day, 
then you're probably going to have to say, I don't want Mr. 
Garcia's help, I'm going to go on my own. 
MR. HASSAN: Not at this point then, I don't want— 
I'm sorry, but I'm ready to— 
MR. GARCIA: Nothing personal. 
THE COURT: Mr. Garcia is not going to take it 
personally. 
MR. GARCIA: May I be excused? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. GARCIA: Thank you. 
MR. PARKER: I do think, your Honor, if he's going 
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to go* on his own, we need to go over what is—seems to be 
known as the Frampton inquiries and that is to check with him 
to see if he understands what he's doing and the results and 
consequences and his inexperience to be able to represent 
himself. 
THE COURT: Well, I kind of thought he—he had 
demonstrated that before, but I mean— 
MR. PARKER: I think we at least ought to go through 
the questions and inquire of him, whether or not the answer is 
obvious. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, let me try tha.t, Mr. 
Hassan. 
You, at this juncture, you're clearly not able to 
hire an attorney, you can't go out and pay for one? 
MR. HASSAN: No. I can't. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, we know that's a fact, 'cause 
you've been in custody for like three years now. 
MR. HASSAN: Two-and-a-half. 
THE COURT: Two-and-a-half. All right. 
So, you'd be a person to whom we could appoint an 
attorney and you understand we'd do that if you wanted, the 
State would pay for your attorney. You've decided today, if I 
understood you right, you don't want the attorney's help. 
MR, HASSAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And so, do you feel like you're 
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competent to go ahead and help yourself? 
MR, HASSAN: I'm pretty sure I'm competent• 
THE COURT: You understand that Mr. Parker is 
trained in the law and that he knows what's going on and in 
theory— 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. And I— 
THE COURT: —I'm trained in the law and I'm 
supposed to know what's going on. 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And so you're the only one of the three 
of us in— 
MR. HASSAN: I know I've got a— 
THE COURT: ~theory~ 
MR. HASSAN: —handicap or whatever, but I have been 
there, done that, I—I just don't want to have any more 
attorneys that won't do what I want and— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HASSAN: —just keep on going. 
THE COURT: Now, you obviously have other remedies 
besides this new trial. And I think you've talked about it, 
you want to appeal something,— 
MR. HASSAN: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: —which is fine, because you understand 
you've got to get this one out of the way first before you go 
that step; but you understand that if you go ahead and because 
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you aren't as experienced and able, you might be giving away 
opportunities or rights that other folks have? 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. I—I'm aware of that, the—the— 
like I said, the only handicap which I'm having with not 
having attorneys is those—that those people are not 
subpoenaed, and but I have—I have those statements and stuff 
that what I will present, but otherwise, you know, they would 
have been subpoenaed. That's something which the Court should 
keep in mind, you know, that I don't have—you know, I tried 
everything to get those people subpoenaed. 
THE COURT: Well, but I mean, so that brings., up a 
very good point. I mean, you're giving up the right to have 
folks come in and give testimony in your behalf, not in your 
personal behalf, but in behalf of a motion that you bring. 
And is that a wise thing for you to do? 
MR. HASSAN: Your Honor, I—I'm way sick and tired 
of the situation. I just do not have any more (inaudible) to 
be with attorneys, be it attorneys and—but they all make me 
look bad and I, you know, it just—whatever happens, it just— 
it's not—it's not that we (inaudible) different way or maybe 
I'm supposed to be representing whatever handicap I have, 
whatever I present, I'll present. I know that we're supposed 
to be (inaudible) and you know, it would be documented type 
stuff, you know, I—I assume. And I'm just saying I just want 
to bring all the (inaudible) I can bring and then from there 
13 
onwards, I just want the transcripts, you know, (inaudible) 
that's all, and then you (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Okay. And I guess since you're just 
sick and tired, that's really why you're doing this; is that a 
wise thing to do? You're just kind of full of it—I mean 
tired of it and so on. 
MR. HASSAN: It's a—it's—the thing is that the way 
I—I can present myself, the way I know the cases, the way I 
know the situation is much better than—than the way other 
attorneys know and the way they—I called earlier to bring all 
those things which I wanted him to bring, you know, so, it's— 
it's always going to be a handicap because I'm—I'm fighting 
this (inaudible) misconduct and so attorneys don't want to 
fight against their own (inaudible) 
THE COURT: I gotcha. All right. Well, you're 
comfortable with what you're doing? 
MR. HASSAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Parker, should we ask him anything 
more? 
MR. PARKER: No. I—I think that's sufficient, your 
Honor. I would place on the record that we have been here 
numerous times and had discussions with the defendant about 
various aspects of this proceeding and he's written both the 
Court and myself and other people numerous times also 
expressing his desires. 
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THE COURT: True. 
MR. PARKER: So, I think given all that, he shows 
and presents and understanding of the procedure and—and at 
least an understanding of what he wants to occur and the way 
he wants it to occur. 
THE COURT: I'd agree with that conclusion. All 
right. Well, we'll catch a few of these others, then we'll 
bring you out and then we'll talk about what we need to do. 
MR. HASSAN: All right. 
(Whereupon, the Judge handled unrelated matters.) 
THE COURT: Bring Mr. Hassan out; right? 
THE CLERK: Yeah. Just go get our (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Are you okay, Mr. Parker, to go now? 
MR. PARKER: Go ahead. 
THE COURT: Let's go. 
OFFICE: Your Honor, are you going to order him to 
be cuffed so he can access— 
THE COURT: How do you feel? 
OFFICER: I really don't know him. The other 
officer would be better asked, I've never had to deal with 
him. So far, he's never been a problem whatsoever. 
THE COURT: Right. You know, there are just moments 
when he kind of gets angry and— 
OFFICER: So, I would— 
THE COURT: But usually, we see that early on, so— 
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Mr. Hassan, the officer was wondering if you should be 
uncuffed and I'm inclined to do what you think is the best. 
MR. PARKER: Would it be appropriate to have one 
hand unrestrained so that if he needs to go through his 
property. 
THE COURT: Well, I think it's fine. It's more of a 
concern— 
OFFICER: Which hand do you right witr:? Right or 
left? 
THE COURT: I mean, I want you to be doing what you 
should. 
OFFICER: Making it our call, basically. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hassan has always been good to—to 
me, but I'm worried about your job. 
OFFICER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: That's—you do it the way you need to, 
MR. HASSAN: You know, I'm mellow today, don't worry 
about it. 
THE COURT: Today you're happy, huh? 
MR. HASSAN: I won't say I'm happy, you know, I'm— 
THE COURT: Well, that's a bad word. 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: But you're good, today. 
How's your arm? You got hurt once, didn't you? 
MR. HASSAN: I—I was—this is the fourth time ray 
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hand has been broken in prison. Once on here and there, then 
my blood vessels, which police officers broke, then my hand 
broke from here, my finger broke. It's just a curse on me. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hassan, we're here then to consider 
your motion for a new trial and we'd like you to begin, if 
you'd like. 
MR. HASSAN: Won't there be any stenograph or 
something, your Honor? 
THE COURT: No, and you know, I think what happened 
is, they got to the point where, on the first degrees, there's 
so few of them anymore, that unless it's a capital case, I 
don't think they come in. 
Isn't that the method now, Marcy? 
THE CLERK: Unless it's an evidentiary hearing. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. Unless we have witness 
testimony. 
THE CLERK: Correct. 
THE COURT: But we do have a tape and— 
MR. HASSAN: Okay. 
THE COURT: You wouldn't have a—(inaudible) I'll 
give you a tape and you can go home and listen to it. That 
won't work. But you know, they can make a record—or a 
transcript from the tape. 
MR. HASSAN: They can? 
THE COURT: Yeah. The tape runs on everything we do, 
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**~anscripts
 r L l i e y d o I I it1 in b a s e d o n l l h e t a p e , s o w e ' r e t i n e 
: n a t w a y . 
Il I i III I I I i  on|nil-*!-, Il ii I i a 1 list ! I 111 I i n 
-«re, you know, 'i, no.o there are a lot ot people interested in 
' * case and stuff, you know, so — 
Till1 "i I HUH' I nil I h a v e a p r o b l e m , 
MR. HASSAN « f I s p e a k - - 1 " 1 i s p e a k - - 1 'LI t ry 
mi I I i i i i i i i i II • l i m n III I III n Il ", mi I' i n 
. Jh t.CJUKT: Yeah, And M "s easier
 l( like you say, 
zor them to pi ok up what you're sayinq, 
II I l l l ' II I A S S A I N ! 'mi" Ill II I I " i n I w a y . i I  i I I I «" 
bit situation. 
THE COURT: i»ve gotten pretty good at understandinq 
MR. HASSAN " * 
THE COUF"' '-\a x icai, .*e Lue ~ . you write now 
"ause you're wr :. ' .. . V o a v&r-j . .\*r vr _ got wanna, 
«i« -a-n-n-a. 
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MR, HASSAN: Oh, did— 
THE COURT: Instead of want to, you wanna. 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. I'm learning the slang— 
THE COURT: I don't know. 
MR. HASSAN: Americanize and then you guys want to 
send me back home, you know. 
THE COURT: There you are, see? 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. I'm—I'm becoming more like you 
and the rest. 
THE COURT: Well, that's not good, you ought to go 
somewhere where you won't have that problem. 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HASSAN: Your Honor, just a couple of things. 
Let me start from the name of (inaudible) the merciful, a 
couple of things I just say before we proceed and it won't be 
wrong at all. This time, I have—and I—I've written more 
things like in writing so I don't go out of line and you know, 
and just start talking all those— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HASSAN: —what I (inaudible) things, you know. 
And I'm just going to pretty much read what I have written to 
you and stuff. 
THE COURT: But just do that clearly and as fully as 
makes sense to you. 
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THE OOLJRT; Kiqht Tt#r> probably n o t — 
MR. HASSAN. i c a l i . NuL qoud t o p i s s him ott r i g h t 
II 1 1 m i , 
THE coflFT G r e a t , 
nii1 HASSAN: uk i / Ypah l i k e 1 s=n1 | k n s e d o n ' t 
i ush rnu t h r o u g h t h e p r o c e e d i n g s . I 11 | I m .Ii i s my second , 
a c t u a l l y t h i r d l anquaqe and I in not a p r o f e s s i o n a l - i t t o r n e y , 
I II P i O I III' M ) l I III III I II III I I I II II II i f 
THE 'i :ulJRTi think we wont over that, 
MR, HASSAN: What's that? 
I IIIIIII nii11 ^ 
y o u r s c r i p t t o IIIIIII • . '• 
MR, HASSAN; o k a y And i t w o u l d m a k e i t iiTialkn" i t 
n o i s i e r I on ", o n niiid o a k i I e a s i e r hoi" IIII , "„ i II1 in » , l «> l < i 
read it because I'm more a philosophical kind of a person so I 
! a k f ii I  mi I I I  " Il i in I I f" i me e x p l a i n i n q t h i n q s a n d a ! Il a n 1 1 
know American way i s d i f f e r e n t , just j t i s l Inn IIIIIII l i k e I h i s . 
THE COURT: Okay. '• 
MR. HASSAN: And having said that, I would remind 
all of you that this proceeding would be closely scrutinized 
by many Pakistani politicians and lawyers, so please—and this 
is—this is a request, you know, please, (inaudible) out of 
logic and not out of like—out of the answer like, you know, 
be like, I think (inaudible) involves a little bit more, you 
know, more personally, you know, like—like, you know, just 
give me the reasonings, this is the reason you are denying it, 
this is the reason you're accepting it, you know, that's—I— 
I'm not trying to tell you your job, but this makes life 
easier for me, you know. 
THE COURT: Well, I think so you'll know, I—if I'm 
going to do it right, I have to do that. 
MR. HASSAN: All right. 
THE COURT: I have to give some reasons for what I 
do. 
MR. HASSAN: Like I said, my experiences are bad; so 
once bitten by a snake, a person is always scared of 
(inaudible) 
THE COURT: I—I'm with you. 
MR. HASSAN: Okay. Let's start over here, these are 
some of the opening arguments. Your Honor, one more time for 
the record that if Judge Stirba died, I'm sorry she did and 
all, that is not my fault. 
THE COURT: No. Nobody ever thought it was. 
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knowledge , t h a t s h e c o u l d s a y , Ilki',," „ 700 Ikni u , t h e t h i n g s a r e 
so c 1 ear , tl ler e wer e t h i n g s t h a (1 u 1» r t • ir 1 • 11 I > 1 < .1<j1111 111:1, I h 1 n g s 
are so cle- 3 ,1: , there's 1 1.0 point of going to trial anymore, 
22 
let's*drop all these (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Okay. And now I'll be candid with you, 
Mr. Hassan, I don't think I could ever do that. 
MR. HASSAN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Because I would have had to have heard 
the trial, and because I am the successor to her, I don't 
think there's any hope at all that I will say, gee, based on 
what he's told me and not having heard the trial, I will now 
find him not guilty and dismiss the case. I could not do 
that. 
MR. HASSAN: Okay. But it's a—but it is a-*-in—in-
-in the—by the—by the books, you know, and by the law, you 
do have the discretion, that's all what I want to say. You— 
you might not do it, that's a separate thing; but Judge Stirba 
has the discretion. 
THE COURT: Right. I think she had it and it 
doesn't make sense for me to try and do that, because I was 
not at the trial, I never saw a single witness; so I mean, for 
me to do what you ask— 
MR. HASSAN: I—I understand, your Honor. What I'm 
saying is, don't you think that it's a disadvantage for me 
that now Judge Stirba is dead, you know, so I have lost that 
opportunity. 
THE COURT: Oh. I mean, like you say, it's not your 
fault, but there's not a thing anybody can do about that. 
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Let's say one more thing, h.r.,, ot the evidences' 
have already been submitted to ,. r>u hi the Court office 
l mi lat i d i lb] e ) airi :i m is urn !•»u11" ' i l l i l l II i I  llin I i I M - P - J I , n i 
justice document. 
I assume that you have srruti nized i t as well as my 
I U H I J 111 II II II i I II ( II I H I! | I I I I I 1 III I 11 I III n I II I 1 I I I l I I , O l I V H I ,i II I »| II Ml I , 
I i naudibie) the findings, the--the motion whirh was—whi : h was 
qivpn to yon by Mary rorporon and most important of all, • ny 
I r i til I L anser ipti.j , 
That's what 1 assume that, vou know in order, you 
audible -.-i « 
THE COUF~ *v . ^ , ^ „_., _ n _
 2 
MR. HASSAN 
THE COURT: Wei -* • • 
that. Okay. • . • ' ' 
MR. HASSAN -*. \ t .1 —it—-xf 
anything, you know, erxionea ^ V P nnt 
scrutinized through, you know, I ki IOW tha t- -
• 1111! Il II'II COURT' N i i|UPSt I. I 1 , in • -
transcript. 
MR. HASSAN:
 2. If you hav e not r ead i t, then-- • 
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then I would humbly suggest that we can do the proceeding, 
then—then please take time before you make the— 
THE COURT: Well — 
MR. HASSAN: —findings— 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) that I should probably—if 
it's relevant, then I ought to— 
MR. HASSAN: Exactly. The trial transcript is the 
key to my case, you know. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HASSAN: And you know how hard we worked to get 
it. 
THE COURT: I'm getting you. 
MR. HASSAN: I also want to bring to the Courts 
attention that in spite of my repeated requests and attempts 
to various attorneys, none of the people who would have helped 
this hearing have been subpoenaed. Those are the facts, we 
can delay it as long as we want and stuff, attorneys play 
games again and again and I don't want to expose this—not 
the—the—the case right now, but trust me to that, that they 
just do not want to fight, a lot of people have looked and 
taken my case. Being (inaudible) and how all these things 
are. 
I also want to— 
THE COURT: Do you mind if I—I mean, I—I just want 
to make it real clear, I am assuming that you don't want them 
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subpoenaed, because 1 don't think I've made it abundantly 
v^ t i, bi it we have the power to have them come ami it; 
a subpoena issued for somebody and you want t.o have 
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statements are not credible and stutt, 1- at this particular 
time " <• ii* *;o get the proceedinq done "lecause evert'nlly 
I In in I I i mi nil <c )„' in mi iii iiiiiii II II II i II i I il 111 w ii, II w HI in I I i id II il nidi i 1 ,' 
t h i n k t h a t t h o s e ,
 r m i know, , ' c a u s e * s e e 1 h a v e t e a d i HIP J-JW 
h o o k s i inc i t h e y 111 II , /ou k n o w , l i t h e r p r e s e n t , Unit unit l I et»| 
" ' i " i J i * • "• o u n c e r * - 1 , '»J ,M ki w, " ' d' >' l u u r s t ' > > t 
ii r e g u l a r a t t o r n e y a n d s o i f y o u t h i n k t h a t i n i s e t h i n g s , 
j i i h p o e i M i in I nl I nl I | in I  IIIIIII hi I in l« i mi II HI | IIII | ihs*-1 11 I HI 
II I  I f in I I h a v e s h o u l d g i u e - ' - q e l IIIIIII II IIIIIPW I I I ill I ion 1 
any—I'm a hundred percent sure on that* 
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THE COURT: Okay. Right. 
MR. HASSAN: (Inaudible) But if you think that those 
things would have been heard in the end, you—you're not 
(inaudible) the statements I have, then we'll—we can talk 
about it after that. 
THE COURT: Okay. I think I understand 
MR. HASSAN: Yeah. Because you think, you know, 
yeah, if—if—if she would have, instead of writing it down, 
she would have been here and said all those things— 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. HASSAN: —that that would have made a different 
picture in your mind, we can talk about that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HASSAN: All right. And I don't know how Mr. 
Parker want to do it, I have everything written down, the 
(inaudible) and stuff, strictly by the Rule 24 and I can start 
reading it and start giving you the exhibits. That's the way 
I planned. 
Does he want to make those objections right now or 
something like that and does he want to give this— 
THE COURT: He would object if, at some point, it's 
appropriate. 
MR. HASSAN: Okay. 
THE COURT: He's there, paying attention. 
MR. HASSAN: Okay. But--
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THE COURT: But the blank look is the one he always 
MR HASSAN: 01 , i\ . . 
T H E COURT: --we're not go i nq to let" a n \ ' better than 
tclt, 
MR- PARKEB 
"nu've seen the movie. 
Okay, Le t' s start the proceedings, I *ill I»e 
ni ' l i in | «i t o r •• n i i o i i i x h i L) 1 I "i .01 in I "' I , H I Ilk i n HI i1 Il I IK 11 • "i» \ nil 1 d i n i s s i s t " 
in e in 11 i inaudible) you c a n - - ( inaudible) 
THE COURT: They pointed at: you, Mack, thai" you 
* jUiii'i! lie helping bring up the exhibits, 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER es. 
f I l l 1 I I A . S S A I I III II l I III" •••'" .1 i i ( II I I I" ( 1 II b l o II I II 
merciful, i our Honor, the reason I'm in troot of yon todav \~ 
to establish the foundation on my request for a new trial , 
III11" mi mi "nil Il . 1 II II Il i n III ii III II mi II , I , i , I. ill mi mi II ILii, '"; i l l I l i e iiiiiei'iiiioi on: i : i i i l l :ii :i: i 
support of motion for new trial, which haw been document • -
documented by oiif of iiry p r e v i o u s c o u n s e l s , Mary Corpor on. Le t 
1 IS i III'1 in III i i I I I III II I III I III • • • • • ' • , • 
THE COURT: And are you nble to leave these w i 1:1 I i is? 
MR • HASSAN": , 1111 r 1111 not. 
THE COURT: uka y . Ma y 111•;" - . 
' UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Pardon ? 
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REHANHASSi il J, 
Hon. Michael K. Burton 
Defendant. 
I his matter came before this court: for hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial on 
\ i igust 1 et 1 ) 2002 Defei icla i it ^ ra s pi s sen: it Pi: o se, I: ta1 • ii lg 
waived appointed counsel, Paul B. Parker, Deputy Salt Lake Distnct - Ittomey; represented the 
State A motion for a new trial v 'ith memoranda had been submitted in defendant's behalf by 
earlier defense counsel, Mate also submitted memoranda W itnesses were called ai id 
testified, Both parties argued the matter fully. 
I Ia\ ing listened t :::! th' 5 witnesses 
I j i h par t ies , this court m a k e s the fo l lowing t i n d i n g s w t ;^;, . ...*. ^»<
 Slb *: ,aw lM ^ .- . 
II II WINGS OF !•',< i IT '.. . 
1. Defendant was charged with multiple counts of Aggravated Burglary and 
Assault in one information and a single count of Aggravated Burglar/ in a 
rlUfl a 
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2. All the counts were alleged to have occurred at the same location The 
majonty of the counts alleged the same two victims, J D and Carol Miller 
and occurred on May 29, 1999 The Millers alleged that defendant had 
kicked open the door to their apartment and had entered three times 
assaulting and threatening them During one of these entries, defendant 
had threatened the Millers with what looked like a small handgun Count 
number three an Assault, was alleged to have occurred on June 3, 1999 
with another victim, Kathy Hams In that count, Kathy Hams allege4 that 
she confronted defendant about a power cord he had plugged into the 
apartment building hall outlet. In response, defendant attacked her. 
3. After separate preliminary hearings, the two informations were combined 
for trial and set before Judge Anne Stirba. 
4. Defendant sought legal assistance and, because of a conflict with the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender's, Office Edward Montgomery was appointed to 
represent defendant. 
5. Ed Montgomery investigated the allegations and defendant's alibi, talked 
with witnesses, reviewed police reports and hired an investigator 
6. Prior to trial, Edward Montgomery filed a motion to sever count three, the 
Assault on Kathy Hams, from the other counts. 
7. After filing the motion, defendant waived the jury trial. 
8. Defendant talked with Mr. Montgomery and defendant's wife about the 
waiver. Defendant and Mr. Montgomery discussed the difficulties and 
benefits of a bench trial as compared to a jury trial. Defendant decided 
that Judge Stirba would be more favorable to defendant rather than a jury 
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R 
that would not likely be able to relate to defendant's background and 
9. Ed Montgomery testified that he withdrew the motion to severe because it 
would nof have made any difference since the indue who would be hearing 
the idse kiiLi\ ihe Litis iln >piicul Mi iUuiUgorner> a testimonv tru 
• court docket indicates that Judge Stirba heard but denied the motion 
iv. The day of the assault on Kathv Hams, poIWe * •'' " K. 
defendant into custody at the scene. Defendant v «» 
identification. He stated that v ' A ^ :t ms car bat *\? >M sav exactly 
where i , IT 
permission ;•> .n .* c , .i •» iuok m* i:v, identification * Mve :p - ,ue ' T. 
car, v n* e -oking for t K e * ientificati- :e 'our i irvt ^e - - sun 
•'>liij(jed i igajeiie Itghiei I lie lighter nuii/hed the description ot trie gun 
the Millers stated that defendant had threatened them with. 
11. Mr. Montgomery did not file a motion tc • suppress the seizi it: e of a gi u: i 
shaped cigarette lighter from defei idant's cai 
12 The bench trial was held on Mi> 
13. Dm ing the ti ial. I Ii I! I :)i: itj • • e • . 
Millers about the ineoi is iskaucs v. *eiumunies, the unusuai joints of 
their testimonies, and he ci oss-examined Ms. N filler about: her past 
also cross-examined Mr. Miller about the damage to the door and his 
attempts to repair the door Mi Montgomery cross-examined Detecti i e 
Brad B u r m i n g h a m about I: lis failui ; to f ii i . i la med "" I \"!a lena, ' ai id 
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whether the door could have actually had been damaged so little as it was 
if it had been locked as the Millers described. 
14. Defendant wanted to present the testimony of some locksmiths who would 
have testified that the door would have been damaged more if the door had 
been kicked in. 
15. Mr. Montgomery refused to present the witnesses because he had 
previously checked with another expert who had said the damage was 
consistent with the Miller's description. In light of that, Mr. Montgomery 
chose, rather than a battle of conflicting experts, to cross-examine and 
impeach the police witness and Mr. Miller on the damage. 
16. Mr. Montgomery also refused to introduce the testimony of some 
character witnesses that would have testified about defendant's good 
character. Defendant had a record of past assaults. Mr. Montgomery did 
not want to open the door to defendant's past assaults by introducing 
evidence of defendant's good character. 
17. Defendant took the stand at the trial and testified that he had been using 
power from the apartment hallway outlets since his own power had been 
shut off. He admitted arguing with Carol Miller at her door about her 
unplugging or cutting his power cords. He also admitted arguing with 
Kathy Harris but said he had to push her out of his apartment. He denied 
entering the Miller's apartments, and assaulting them. He denied 
assaulting Kathy Harris. 
18. Following the evidence and the arguments, Judge Stirba found defendant 
guilty of two counts of Aggravated Burglary and three counts of Assault. 
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• Defendant was sentenced to prison on July 18, 2000. 
.• : i " i it 
defendant and his wife present, ric found, that her testimony would not 
have helped defendant. Malena was also reluctant to testify'1 since she was 
would expose her 
relationship with defendant. 
21. > lalena's testimony, proffered in * 
apartment with defendant ^ derenaa*^ J ^ .-. ,
 it 
argument in the hallwa) in which a woman and defendant both spoke with 
entered the Miller's apartment. She did say that after defendant returned, 
he did not leave the apartment any more that e\ ening. 
22. < r 
attorneys, one of whom filed the motion for a new trial Before the motion 
was heard defendant waived further assistance of counsel \\M\ pn ce^ri it 
the hearing on the motion, Pro se. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's decision to w.iivt" flu1 iiiiin .MH <I I IHMF mil iiiihiHininl n i 
Defendant had the advise ol counsel 1 Ic made a choice among 
alternatives and his decision was not unreasonable. -
2. Ed Montgomery's 
strategy and not unreasonable. 
3. Ed Montgomery's decision, to ^ vithdrau the motion to sever was sound 
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informed, by the informations and the motion, of all the counts and the 
allegations upon with the counts were based. 
4. There was not a legal basis to support a motion to suppress since 
defendant had consented to the search of his car for identification and the 
cigarette lighter that looked like a gun was found during that search. 
5. Ed Montgomery's decision not to send notice of experts and call experts 
about the damage to the door was a reasonable trial strategy given the fact 
that the experts were conflicting and the inconsistencies in the Miller's 
statements were such that he could choose to impeach their testimonies 
more effectively. 
6. Ed Montgomery's decision to not call witnesses about defendant's good 
character was sound trial strategy particularly because admission of good 
character in evidence would have allowed the State to introduce evidence 
of defendant's bad character. 
7. Ed Montgomery was not ineffective in his assistance of defendant at trial. 
8. The testimonies of the locksmiths are not new and previously unavailable 
evidence because the statements were known and available before the 
trial. 
9. The testimony of Malena was not an "alibi" because she was not present 
during the argument and the assaults. Instead, her purported testimony, 
was merely cumulative of other evidence presented and therefore would 
not have changed the outcome of the trial. 
10. There are no grounds for granted defendant's motion for a new trial. 
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ORDER 
Rased u|puii iL |iw.u!iiiiv, 1'imliHi s» otl\ii I ind i niu lusinns iM I ,i\v 11 IS 
ORDERED that defendant's motion for a new trial is DENTED. 
t . . . i 
WfhdayofOjUetJer. 2002. 
j \ T^E COURT: / ; -
MICHAEL K. BURTON, 
Approved as to form: 
U District jffd&5>A 
Rehan Hassan, Pro se 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law And Order was delivered to Pro Se, Attorney for Defendant Rehan Hassan, 
at P.O. Box 250, Salt Lake City, Utah 84020 on the y ^ d a y of October, 2002. 
